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Algorithmic Governance from the Bottom Up
Hannah Bloch-Wehba*
Artificial intelligence and machine learning are both a blessing and a
curse for governance. In theory, algorithmic governance makes
government more efficient, more accurate, and more fair. But the
emergence of automation in governance also rests on public-private
collaborations that expand both public and private power, aggravate
transparency and accountability gaps, and create significant obstacles for
those seeking algorithmic justice. In response, a nascent body of law
proposes technocratic policy changes to foster algorithmic accountability,
ethics, and transparency.
This Article examines an alternative vision of algorithmic governance,
one advanced primarily by social and labor movements instead of
technocrats and firms. The use of algorithmic governance in increasingly
high-stakes settings has generated an outpouring of activism, advocacy,
and resistance. This mobilization draws on the same concerns that animate
budding policy responses. But social and labor movements offer an
alternative source of constraints on algorithmic governance: direct resistance
from the bottom up. These movements confront head-on the entanglement of
economic power, racial hierarchy, and government surveillance.
*Associate Professor of Law, Texas A&M University School of Law; Affiliate Fellow,
Yale Law School Information Society Project; Affiliate Fellow, NYU School of Law Policing
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Anna Wiener and Peter Yu for helpful conversations and thoughtful insights on this
project. This Article also benefited greatly from feedback during presentations at the
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Using three case studies, this Article explores how tech workers and
social movements are resisting and mobilizing against technologies that
expand surveillance and funnel wealth to the private sector. Each case
study illustrates how the intermingling of state and private power has
required movements to engage both within and outside firms to counteract
the growing appeal of automation. Yet the dominant approaches to
regulating the government’s uses of technology continue to afford a
privileged role to private firms and elite institutions, sidelining movement
demands. The fundamental challenge posed by these movements will be
whether—and how—law and policy can accommodate demands for
bottom-up control. This Article sketches a new vision for algorithmic
accountability, with a more vibrant role for workers and for the public in
determining how firms and government institutions work together.
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INTRODUCTION
In March 2017, a group of forty protesters assembled outside of
a building on San Francisco’s Billionaire’s Row.1 The crowd was
gathered outside of a powerful individual’s home to demand a
change in policy—a classic form of public protest.2 But the target of
the demonstration was not a legislator or a public official. Instead,
demonstrators were outside the house of Peter Thiel, the
co-founder of surveillance firm Palantir Technologies, in protest of
the company’s decision to provide a software program to
Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE).3 The Department of
Homeland Security (DHS) had awarded Palantir a contract to
provide a new case management system that would enable DHS to
upgrade its mainframe-based custom software to a web-enabled,
commercially available tool.4 Activists opposing the contract
had organized the picketing, a form of public protest they believed
would “raise awareness” and solidarity among Palantir’s whitecollar workforce.5
New technologies are transforming law enforcement in
increasingly high-stakes settings.6 As Palantir’s collaboration
with ICE illustrates, these shifts depend in large part on
partnerships between government and private vendors. Police
contract with firms that provide facial recognition and surveillance
technology. Immigration enforcement relies on cloud services and
1. Anna Wiener, Why Protesters Gathered Outside Peter Thiel’s Mansion This Weekend,
THE NEW YORKER (Mar. 14, 2017), http://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/whyprotesters-gathered-outside-peter-thiels-mansion-this-weekend.
2. Alfred Kamin, Residential Picketing and the First Amendment, 61 NW. U. L. REV.
177 (1967).
3. Wiener, supra note 1.
4. ICE Investigative Case Management System, SAM.GOV, https://sam.gov/opp/
36fb3b697a2ccb4ec7084b4e0ec6cdb9/view (last accessed Sept. 3, 2022).
5. Wiener, supra note 1.
6. Christian Katzenbach & Lena Ulbricht, Algorithmic Governance, 8 INTERNET POL’Y
REV. 2 (2019) (defining algorithmic governance as “a form of social ordering that relies on
coordination between actors, is based on rules and incorporates particularly complex
computer-based epistemic procedures[]”). This Article focuses on automated decisionmaking in government itself. Cf. Hannah Bloch-Wehba, Access to Algorithms, 88 FORDHAM L.
REV. 1265, 1267 (2020) (defining algorithmic governance).
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enterprise software. National security agencies seek an array of
artificial intelligence techniques to bolster warfighting and
defense.7 The expanding private role in law enforcement is not just
a force multiplier for the state. It also creates new opportunities—
and new obstacles—for activists, advocates, and movements.
This Article examines how social and labor movements
are responding to these dramatic shifts in governance. The state’s
use of novel technologies to mete out punishment, allocate benefits,
and otherwise classify individuals and communities is being met
by a growing wave of popular opposition.8 Popular resistance
finds its most ardent support amid calls to democratize policing
and criminal law enforcement. But concerns about datafication
aren’t limited to policing, or even to the state itself.9 Bottom-up
movements must also respond to the intermingling of state
and private power that has accompanied this shift. A cottage
industry of technologies and techniques—biometric surveillance,
license plate readers, predictive policing, and social media
monitoring, to name just a handful—are transforming law
enforcement and expanding its capacity. Social and labor
movements thus have developed a new focus, seeking broader
accountability for the technologies and partnerships that underpin law
enforcement’s power.10

7. See infra Part II.
8. For example, British students demonstrated against the U.K. education system’s
use of a predictive algorithm to grade A-level exams. Louise Amoore, Why
“Ditch the Algorithm” is the Future of Political Protest, GUARDIAN (Aug. 19, 2020),
http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2020/aug/19/ditch-the-algorithmgeneration-students-a-levels-politics. In California, front-line workers demonstrated against
the use of a predictive tool to allocate access to the COVID vaccine. Lenny Bernstein, Lateshia
Beachum & Hannah Knowles, Stanford Apologizes for Coronavirus Vaccine Plan that Left Out
Many Front-Line Doctors, WASH. POST (Dec. 18, 2020), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
health/2020/12/18/stanford-hospital-protest-covid-vaccine/.
9. Lina Dencik & Anne Kaun, Datafication and the Welfare State, GLOB. PERSPS. (June
23, 2020), https://online.ucpress.edu/gp/article-abstract/1/1/12912/110743/Dataficationand-the-Welfare-State?redirectedFrom=fulltext.
10. See, e.g., Rashida Richardson, Jason M. Schultz & Vincent M. Southerland,
Litigating Algorithms 2019 Us Report: New Challenges to Government Use of Algorithmic Decision
Systems, A.I. NOW INST. (2019), https://ainowinstitute.org/litigatingalgorithms-2019-us.pdf;
Elizabeth E. Joh, Policing by Numbers: Big Data and the Fourth Amendment, 89 WASH. L. REV.
35, 48 (2014) (“While surveillance has long been an essential tool of the police, what has
changed is its supporting technology.”).
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To date, legal scholars and policymakers have largely
overlooked grassroots opposition to these arrangements. Instead,
the dominant approaches to addressing the failings of algorithmic
governance are technocratic. Scholars and policymakers have
repeatedly called for interventions to ensure that these sophisticated
mechanisms are trustworthy, transparent, accountable, and fair.11
A rich interdisciplinary literature explores the promise of designing
automated systems to make decisions consistent with law, policy,
and public values and to provide intelligible reasons for those
decisions.12 This technocratic vision of top-down algorithmic
reform—though by no means without its critics—has become the
foremost framework in scholarly and policy circles.13
The technocratic approach rightly highlights the urgent need
for algorithmic reform. But it also overlooks the potential of
popular mobilization both to resist current modes of governance
and to inform our vision of what the future should hold.
This Article focuses on a different vision of algorithmic governance,
one put forth predominantly by social and labor movements.
Movements often share the technocrats’ understandings of
the basic flaws of algorithmic governance: transparency,
accountability, and fairness deficits. But in contrast to the faith in
top-down reform, social and labor movements offer an alternative
source of constraints on algorithmic governance: direct resistance
from the bottom up. This resistance frequently seeks not to improve
algorithmic governance through technology or policy but rather to
eliminate or significantly curtail it in a given sphere.14
I call this the “democratic vision” of algorithmic governance. By
“democratic,” I mean that this vision demands that all citizens

11. See infra Part I.
12. See infra Part I.
13. Cf. Daniel A. Crane, Technocracy and Antitrust, 86 TEX. L. REV. 1159, 1160 (2008)
(describing how antitrust enforcement has become more “technocratic”: “It has become
increasingly separated from popular politics, insulated from direct democratic pressures,
delegated to industrial-policy specialists, and compartmentalized as a regulatory
discipline.”); see also Andrew Guthrie Ferguson, Surveillance and the Tyrant Test, 110 GEO. L.J.
205, 212 (2021) (manuscript on file with author) (describing the “technocratic lens” on
policing, which “emphasizes ex ante rules, transparent policies, and audits as external
accountability mechanisms to address potential misuse”).
14. See infra Part II.
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should have an equal say in making “political judgments.”15
Algorithmic governance might be “democratic” in one sense—its
adoption might be the product of competitive elections or an
administrative system that is ultimately accountable to the public
through political and legal channels.16 Yet in another sense, it can
be fundamentally undemocratic: firms and governments can set
policy through design and procurement processes shielded from
public input and, to an even greater extent, public control.17
Algorithmic governance forges ahead without the consent of those
whom it most profoundly affects, whether they are members of
affected communities or workers asked to build oppressive
technology.18 And, once adopted, algorithmic mechanisms reinforce
existing hierarchies and justify continuing disparities.19
By contrast, the democratic vision stresses that governance
should proceed from the bottom up, rather than from the top down.
By a “bottom up” approach, I mean not only that movements are
playing a significant role in algorithmic governance outside of
traditional, formal, and court-centered institutions.20 I also mean
15. Jedediah Britton-Purdy, David Singh Grewal, Amy Kapczynski & Sabeel Rahman,
Building a Law-and-Political-Economy Framework: Beyond the Twentieth-Century Synthesis, 129
YALE L.J. 1784, 1827 (2020); Nikolas Bowie, Antidemocracy, 135 HARV. L. REV. 160, 167 (2021)
(“[W]hat has historically distinguished democracy as a unique form of government is its
pursuit of political equality.”) (emphasis in original).
16. JOSEPH
SCHUMPETER,
CAPITALISM,
SOCIALISM,
&
DEMOCRACY
269
(Routledge 2006) (1943).
17. See infra Section IV.B; see, e.g., Deirdre K. Mulligan & Kenneth A. Bamberger,
Procurement as Policy: Administrative Process for Machine Learning, 34 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 773,
788–89 (2019); Alicia Solow-Niederman, Administering Artificial Intelligence, 93 S. CAL. L. REV.
633 (2020).
18. Ngozi Okidegbe, The Democratizing Potential of Algorithms?, 53 CONN. L. REV.
(forthcoming 2021) (manuscript at 30) (on file with author) (describing how efforts to
promote participation in decisions about algorithmic governance have centered on “the expost solicitation of public input”).
19. See, e.g., Ifeoma Ajunwa, The Paradox of Automation as Anti-Bias Intervention, 41
CARDOZO L. REV. 1671, 1673–75 (2020) (exploring the role of algorithms in “perpetuating
inequality in the labor market”); Danielle Keats Citron & Frank Pasquale, The Scored Society:
Due Process for Automated Predictions, 89 WASH. L. REV. 1 (2014) (exploring disparate impacts
of credit scoring); VIRGINIA EUBANKS, AUTOMATING INEQUALITY: HOW HIGH-TECH TOOLS
PROFILE, POLICE, AND PUNISH THE POOR (2018) (exploring algorithmic tools in the
welfare system).
20. Howard Erlanger, Bryant Garth, Jane Larson, Elizabeth Mertz, Victoria Nourse &
David Wilkins, Is It Time for a New Legal Realism?, 2005 WIS. L. REV. 335, 357 (2005) (describing
how “new governance” “reinvent[s] governance from the ‘bottom up’ by rejecting ancient
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that movements are trying to build power for individuals and
groups at the “bottom” of the social and political hierarchy.21
Delineating and contrasting these two visions yield several
compelling insights. First, the democratic vision has largely failed
to find a foothold in the emerging law constraining algorithmic
governance, which is often top-down by default. In large part,
current mechanisms for reining in algorithmic governance sideline
or ignore movement demands. Even when contemporary policy
proposals attempt to address these demands, they often fall short.22
Second, the competing visions of algorithmic governance expose
central questions about the role of participation in a democratic
society. In an era of increasing reliance on private sector technology
vendors, what might a “more genuine democracy” look like?23
More precisely, what is the role of the public in determining
whether, how, and when we ought to be governed by technology?
These questions point to yawning gaps in the existing institutions
and legal frameworks for addressing algorithmic governance. We
still have the opportunity to integrate this democratic vision into
law and legal institutions.
Crucially, the democratic vision also extends beyond the
government to the private firms that supply technologies of
governance.24 At firms such as Microsoft, Google, and Amazon,
labor and social movements are working hand in hand to
demand changes to corporate partnerships with federal, state,
and local government institutions. In a world in which private
enterprise supplies so much of the infrastructure of governance,
firms themselves are becoming significant sites of democratic
contestation and resistance.25
administrative strategies of command and control and replacing them with a continuous
dynamic process governed by the relevant stakeholders”); Michael Wilkinson, Three
Conceptions of Law: Towards a Jurisprudence of Democratic Experimentalism, 2010 WIS. L. REV.
673, 673–74 (2010) (describing the turn away from “an image of law that is state-centered,
unified, and hierarchical” toward one that is “decentered, fragmented, and heterarchical”).
21. Erlanger, supra note 20, at 340 (describing “bottom-up” scholarship as requiring
“sensitiv[ity] to the realities of power arrangements and hierarchies in studying law”).
22. See infra Part III.
23. Britton-Purdy et al., supra note 15, at 1834.
24. See infra Part IV.C.
25. Bowie, supra note 15, at 183 (describing the movement to democratize the
workplace through “radical organizing”).
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In contrast to the technocratic vision, the democratic approach
does not advocate for tech that is more “fair,” more capable of
explanation, or more accountable to the existing law or to an
additional layer of oversight. Instead, movements call for real
power to determine whether, when, and how governments deploy
technology in high-stakes settings.26 By exploring these demands
for more “genuine accountability,” rather than technocratic
assurances, the Article adds to the scholarly literature concerned
with what it means for automated systems to be “accountable.”27 It
also draws on a growing body of legal scholarship confronting the
need to shift power over law enforcement toward those who are
most affected by it.28
The rest of this Article is organized in four parts. Part I places
governments’ embrace of automated decision-making in the
context of shifts toward privatization, informality, and flexibility in
26. See Jocelyn Simonson, Police Reform Through a Power Lens, 130 YALE L.J. 778, 787
(2021) (arguing that a key goal of police reforms is often to “shift power away from the police
and toward policed communities”); Okidegbe, supra note 18 (describing how a participatory
process to inform Pennsylvania’s decision to adopt risk assessment at sentencing nonetheless
failed to empower the communities most affected).
27. Britton-Purdy et al., supra note 15, at 1834–35 (calling for a new scholarly agenda
to confront, among others, “the challenges posed by emerging forms of power and control
arising from new technologies”); Ari Ezra Waldman, Power, Process, and Automated DecisionMaking, 88 FORDHAM L. REV. 613, 624 (2019). See, e.g., Joshua A. Kroll, Joanna Huey, Solon
Barocas, Edward W. Felten, Joel R. Reidenberg, David G Robinson & Harlan Yu, Accountable
Algorithms, 165 U. PA. L. REV. 633 (2017); Deborah Hellman, Measuring Algorithmic Fairness,
106 VA. L. REV. 811 (2020); Florian Cech, Beyond Transparency: Exploring Algorithmic
Accountability, in COMPANION OF THE 2020 ACM INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON
SUPPORTING GROUP WORK 11–14 (2020); Nicholas Diakopoulos, Accountability in Algorithmic
Decision Making, 59 COMMUN. ACM 56 (2016); Mike Ananny & Kate Crawford, Seeing Without
Knowing: Limitations of the Transparency Ideal and Its Application to Algorithmic Accountability,
20 NEW MEDIA & SOC’Y 973 (2018); Margot E. Kaminski, Binary Governance: Lessons from the
GDPR’s Approach to Algorithmic Accountability, 92 S. CAL. L. REV. 1529 (2019); SOLON
BAROCAS, ELIZABETH BRADLEY, VASANT HONAVAR & FOSTER PROVOST, COMPUTING CMTY.
CONSORTIUM,
BIG
DATA,
DATA
SCIENCE,
AND
CIVIL
RIGHTS
(2017),
https://pennstate.pure.elsevier.com/ws/portalfiles/portal/38098667/1706.03102v1.pdf;
Manish Raghavan, Solon Barocas, Jon Kleinberg & Karen Levy, Mitigating Bias in Algorithmic
Hiring: Evaluating Claims and Practices (2019), http://arxiv.org/abs/1906.09208; Reuben
Binns, Algorithmic Accountability and Public Reason, 31 PHIL. TECH. 543 (2018); Brent Daniel
Mittelstadt, Patrick Allo, Mariarosaria Taddeo & Luciano Floridi, The Ethics of Algorithms:
Mapping the Debate, 3 BIG DATA & SOCIETY 10–11 (2016), DOI:10.1177/2053951716679679.
28. Okidegbe, supra note 18; Amna A. Akbar, Toward a Radical Imagination of Law, 93
N.Y.U. L. REV. 405 (2018); Simonson, supra note 26; Dorothy E. Roberts, Democratizing
Criminal Law as an Abolitionist Project, 111 NW. U. L. REV. 1597 (2017); Joshua Kleinfeld,
Manifesto of Democratic Criminal Justice, 111 NW. U. L. REV. 1367 (2017).
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government service provision. It then draws on existing scholarly
critiques to explain the risk that automation might undermine
important social and political values.
Part II examines three case studies that highlight the potential
of extralegal mobilization and strategic alliances between social
and labor movements to resist and oppose algorithmic governance.
In criminal law enforcement, national security, and immigration
settings, progressive movements are forming coalitions alongside
tech workers to demand democratic participation and control of the
mechanisms of governance.
Part III evaluates the extent to which the law currently responds
to social and labor movement demands and examines the potential
of more radical reforms to more directly empower communities
and citizens in the area of algorithmic governance. Part IV
concludes by asking how law can help to create the conditions for
a more democratic form of algorithmic governance. Drawing on
political theory, the Article begins to sketch a new vision for
algorithmic accountability that places democratic participation at
its center.
I. ALGORITHMIC GOVERNANCE AND ITS DISCONTENTS
At every level, government is experiencing an “algorithmic
turn.”29 In recent years, legal scholars have explored how the rise of
automation is altering the power and capacity of the public sector
across diverse domains.30 This Part explores some of the potential
29. Mulligan & Bamberger, supra note 17, at 791; Ajunwa, The Paradox of Automation,
supra note 19, at 1683.
30. Danielle Keats Citron, Technological Due Process, 85 WASH. U. L. REV. 1249 (2008);
Emily Berman, A Government of Laws and Not of Machines, 98 B.U. L. REV. 1277 (2018); Rebecca
Wexler, Life, Liberty, and Trade Secrets: Intellectual Property in the Criminal Justice System, 70
STAN. L. REV. 1343 (2018); Kate Crawford & Jason Schultz, AI Systems as State Actors, 119
COLUM. L. REV. 1941 (2019); Paul Schwartz, Data Processing and Government Administration:
The Failure of the American Legal Response to the Computer, 43 HASTINGS L.J. 1321 (1992);
Andrew Guthrie Ferguson, Big Data and Predictive Reasonable Suspicion, 163 U. PA. L. REV. 327
(2015); Rebecca Crootof, The Killer Robots Are Here: Legal and Policy Implications, 36 CARDOZO
L. REV. 1837 (2014); Elizabeth E. Joh, The New Surveillance Discretion: Automated Suspicion, Big
Data, and Policing, 10 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 15 (2016); Ryan Calo & Danielle Keats Citron,
The Automated Administrative State: A Crisis of Legitimacy, 70 EMORY L.J. 816 (2021); Vera
Eidelman, The First Amendment Case for Public Access to Secret Algorithms Used in Criminal
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costs of this transformation. First, algorithmic governance promises
a form of efficiency that both rests on and amplifies existing
tendencies toward privatization and managerialism, often at the
expense of democratic participation. Second, regardless of AI’s
potential efficiency gains, its use also comes at a potentially high
cost to individual rights, civil liberties, and other legal obligations.31
A. Algorithms as “Governance”
As early law and tech scholarship recognized, technology can
constrain, shape, and regulate behavior as effectively as (and
perhaps more effectively than) law and regulation itself.32 This
recognition has transformed technology into a powerful tool for
private governance and, at times, a substitute for public
regulation. For example, the analogy between the regulating
abilities of technology and legal constraints encouraged potential
regulators of the Internet to defer to private ordering and
self-regulation.33 Imbued with the power to de facto regulate,
technology itself became a core mechanism by which governance
could be accomplished.
A key justification for algorithmic decision-making is resourcerelated: algorithms are more “efficient” than human decision
makers, or human bureaucracies.34 The deployment of algorithmic
Trials, 34 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 915 (2018); Bloch-Wehba, Access to Algorithms, supra note 6; Sandra
G. Mayson, Bias in, Bias out, 128 YALE L. J. 2218 (2019); Jon Kleinberg, Jens Ludwig, Sendhil
Mullainathan & Cass R. Sunstein, Discrimination in the Age of Algorithms, 10 J. LEG. ANALYSIS
62 (2018); EUBANKS, supra note 19; Rory Van Loo, Rise of the Digital Regulator, 66 DUKE L.J.
1267 (2017); Alicia Solow-Niederman, YooJung Choi & Guy Van den Broeck, The Institutional
Life of Algorithmic Risk Assessment, 34 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 705 (2019); Kiel Brennan-Marquez
& Stephen E. Henderson, Artificial Intelligence and Role-Reversible Judgment, 109 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 137 (2019); Marion Fourcade & Jeffrey Gordon, Learning Like a State: Statecraft
in the Digital Age, 1 J. L. POL. ECON. 78 (2020).
31. See generally, e.g., Citron, supra note 30; Wexler, supra note 30; Calo & Citron, supra
note 30, at 816.
32. Joel R. Reidenberg, Lex Informatica: The Formulation of Information Policy Rules
Through Technology, 76 TEX. L. REV. 553 (1998); LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE: VERSION 2.0 (2006).
33. See Hannah Bloch-Wehba, Global Platform Governance: Private Power in the Shadow
of the State, 72 S.M.U. L. REV. 27, 34 (2019) (“[A]t critical junctures, governments supported
the emergence of online self-governance and self-regulation in the belief that it would
stimulate innovation.”).
34. See Matthew M. Young, Justin B. Bullock & Jesse D. Lecy, Artificial Discretion as a
Tool of Governance: A Framework for Understanding the Impact of Artificial Intelligence on Public
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governance processes reflects how assumptions about efficiency
have become embedded in broader expectations about what the
government should (and should not) do.35 Algorithmic governance
promises to address the challenges that chronically underfunded
and resource-strapped public agencies face and to streamline the
government’s delivery of services.36
In part, enthusiasm about algorithmic governance reflects both
the appeal of efficiency and the influence of “private-sector
management methods” within government—what some have
called “managerialism.”37 As government institutions increasingly
prize the ability to make use of data flows and patterns in setting
and enforcing policy, algorithms first used in private contexts are
remaking government itself.38 Some have also argued that
government entities ought to “keep pace and make use of the same
analytic tools” as the private sector businesses they regulate.39
The relationship between government and private-sector
innovation is literal as well as metaphorical. Despite lingering
uncertainties about whether algorithmic governance can fulfill its
promise, state and local governments often contract out to
technology firms or other providers. Governments “partner” with
private firms that can collect and analyze coveted data, supply

Administration, 2 PERSPS. ON PUB. MGMT. GOV’T 1, 1 (2019) (“[Artificial discretion] creates
opportunities for more efficient and reliable government, as well as the potential to cause
significant harm.”).
35. Cf. Adam Dahl & Joe Soss, Neoliberalism for the Common Good? Public Value
Governance and the Downsizing of Democracy, 74 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 496, 497 (2014) (describing
the emergence of public value governance, which aims to “displace neoliberal modes of
governance that privilege markets, empower self-serving economic actors, and reduce the
public good to an aggregation of private interests”).
36. Bloch-Wehba, Access to Algorithms, supra note 6, at 1275 (“Agencies often rely on
the ‘objectivity’ or ‘efficiency’ of their data-driven decision-making procedures to justify
cost-cutting measures . . . .”).
37. R. A. W. Rhodes, The New Governance: Governing Without Government, 44 POL. STUD.
652, 655 (1996).
38. JULIE E. COHEN, BETWEEN TRUTH AND POWER: THE LEGAL CONSTRUCTIONS OF
INFORMATIONAL CAPITALISM 144–45 (2019); Waldman, supra note 27, at 626; Fourcade &
Gordon, supra note 30, at 81 (“Dataism . . . is an ideology that finds the purpose of
government in what can be measured rather than in the will of the people.”).
39. Cary Coglianese & David Lehr, Regulating by Robot: Administrative Decision Making
in the Machine-Learning Era, 105 Geo. L.J. 1147, 1153 (2017).
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networked technologies, and build the infrastructure for a variety
of governance “solutions.”40
These dynamics underscore the risk that privatization and
outsourcing enable private vendors to usurp government
functions and reduce state capacity.41 For decades, scholars of
administrative law and constitutional law have grappled with the
implications of outsourcing and privatizing government functions.42
Scholars have considered, for example, how private companies can
serve “public functions” consistently with principles of government
accountability.43 The attenuated accountability mechanisms for
private contractors have led scholars to contemplate whether the
“state action” requirement ought to be loosened under some
circumstances.44 Although the focus of many of these interventions
40. Robert Brauneis & Ellen P. Goodman, Algorithmic Transparency for the Smart City,
20 YALE J. L. & TECH. 103, 114 (2018); BEN GREEN, THE SMART ENOUGH CITY: PUTTING
TECHNOLOGY IN ITS PLACE TO RECLAIM OUR URBAN FUTURE 133–34 (2019) (“[G]overnments
across the United States rely on contracts to complete many of their most essential
tasks. . . .”). A recent report on the use of algorithms in the federal administrative state
concluded that a slight majority of the federal government’s use cases for artificial
intelligence were developed in-house. David Freeman Engstrom, Daniel E. Ho, Catherine M.
Sharkey & Mariano-Florentino Cuéllar, Government by Algorithm: Artificial Intelligence in
Federal Administrative Agencies (NYU School of Law, Public Law Research Paper No. 20-54
2020), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3551505. While the federal
government does develop a substantial portion of its own AI tools, state and local
governments may be more inclined to procure “off the shelf” methodologies.
41. Jon D. Michaels, Privatization’s Pretensions, 77 U. CHI. L. REV. 717, 723 (2010)
(“[L]egal scholarship has instead tended to focus on privatization in terms of the Executive’s
ceding of sovereignty, rather than its amassing of it. . . .”).
42. See, e.g., Martha Minow, Public and Private Partnerships: Accounting for the New
Religion, 116 HARV. L. REV. 1229 (2003); Alfred C. Aman Jr., Privatization and the Democracy
Problem in Globalization: Making Markets More Accountable Through Administrative Law, 28
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1477, 1486 (2001) (“When is the market primarily a regulatory scheme
designed to achieve certain public policy results and when is it a manifestation of individual
freedom, the outcome of which is, by definition, correct?”); Jody Freeman, The Private Role in
the Public Governance, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 543, 549 (2000) (describing “the possibility of
harnessing private capacity to serve public goals”).
43. Gillian E. Metzger, Privatization as Delegation, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1367 (2003);
Kenneth A. Bamberger, Regulation as Delegation: Private Firms, Decisionmaking, and
Accountability in the Administrative State, 56 DUKE L.J. 377 (2006); Van Loo, supra note 30, at
1321 (“[U]nchecked agency reliance on potentially manipulative and deceptive machines
serving as market gatekeepers at some point is in tension with an accountable
administrative state.”).
44. Metzger, supra note 43, at 1411 (arguing that state action doctrine “ignores the way
that privatization gives private actors control over government programs and resources,
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has been on extending accountability norms from the public into
the private sphere, in recent years, scholars have increasingly
questioned whether the private role in governance warrants more
foundational intervention.45
These shifts toward privatization and informality characterize
what is sometimes called “new governance” or “collaborative
governance.”46 “New governance” emerged from a critique of
top-down regulatory models that failed to facilitate widespread
public participation.47 In their place, scholars have sought
models that provide opportunities for more significant, direct
stakeholder participation.48
In theory, “new governance” frameworks permit democratic
participation at a variety of levels and through a variety of
institutional arrangements: public meetings, task forces, and
advisory councils can all serve to permit “citizen users” to
collaborate closely with government.49 This “optimistic vision of
stakeholder collaboration” sees privatization, devolution, and
informality as laying the groundwork for a more participatory state
that is more responsive and accountable to all of its citizens.50
Rather than permitting only the most powerful and influential
actors to dominate the regulatory process, the “new governance”
model is meant to reduce barriers to participation and serve as a
“dynamic, reflexive, and flexible regime” open to change and
to self-regulation.51

focusing instead on identifying government involvement in specific private acts”); PAUL R.
VERKUIL, OUTSOURCING SOVEREIGNTY: WHY PRIVATIZATION OF GOVERNMENT FUNCTIONS
THREATENS DEMOCRACY AND WHAT WE CAN DO ABOUT IT (2007).
45. See, e.g., COHEN, supra note 38, at 187. This Article saves for another day a full
discussion of whether, and when, technology vendors ought to be considered state actors.
46. Lisa T. Alexander, Stakeholder Participation in New Governance: Lessons from
Chicago’s Public Housing Reform Experiment, 16 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL’Y 117, 120 (2009).
47. Id. at 125.
48. Michael C. Dorf & Charles F. Sabel, A Constitution of Democratic Experimentalism,
98 COLUM. L. REV. 267, 288 (1998); Solow-Niederman, supra note 17, at 646.
49. Dorf & Sabel, supra note 48, at 318.
50. Alexander, supra note 46, at 121.
51. Orly Lobel, The Renew Deal: The Fall of Regulation and the Rise of Governance in
Contemporary Legal Thought, 89 MINN. L. REV. 342, 365 (2004).
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The expansion of algorithmic governance is a logical consequence
of policy that values efficiency, markets, and privatization.52 Yet it
has not been the unambiguous win for participation that “new
governance” theorists might have predicted. The introduction of
algorithms into political contexts fraught with power disparities
has enhanced the power of the private sector but not meaningfully
boosted the power of marginalized individuals or groups.53 For
example, ambiguity about key terms (such as “algorithmic
transparency”) and mechanisms for accountability (such as
“ethics” and “auditing”) has allowed industry standards to
compete with, and sometimes displace, public regulation as a
source of constraint.54 Private vendors sometimes invoke trade
secrecy to avoid disclosing key information in discovery or under
state and federal public records statutes.55 With much of the key
information about algorithmic governance in private hands and
kept confidential, ordinary citizens are rarely equipped with
the knowledge or power to understand how these new modes
of governance function.56 And as Ngozi Okidegbe has deftly
illustrated, policies designed to promote participation in decisions
about algorithmic governance often only solicit “public input” after
the fact.57

52. Waldman, supra note 27, at 615 (“[A]lgorithmic decision-making systems are
social, political, and economic expressions of what Julie Cohen and others have called
neoliberal managerialization, or an organizational system of public or private governance
that prioritizes freedom and efficiency above all other values.”); John M. Bryson, Barbara C.
Crosby & Laura Bloomberg, Public Value Governance: Moving Beyond Traditional Public
Administration and the New Public Management, 74 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 445, 447 (2014).
53. Alexander, supra note 46, at 133 (observing that “[m]uch new governance scholarship
tends to de-emphasize public problems that involve complex relations of power”).
54. This argument is more fully developed in Part III. See also JULIE E. COHEN, BETWEEN
TRUTH AND POWER: THE LEGAL CONSTRUCTIONS OF INFORMATIONAL CAPITALISM 189–90
(2019) (describing the role of compliance monitoring, reporting, and standard-setting);
Hannah Bloch-Wehba, Transparency’s AI Problem, in DATA AND DEMOCRACY, KNIGHT FIRST
AMEND. INST. COLUM. UNIV. (2021), https://knightcolumbia.org/content/transparencys-aiproblem (“The private sector not only occupies a central role in making ‘transparency’
technically achievable, but also in interpreting its core meaning.”).
55. Natalie Ram, Christi J. Guerrini & Amy L. McGuire, Genealogy Databases and the
Future of Criminal Investigation, 360 SCIENCE 1078, 1078–79 (2018); Wexler, supra note 30,
at 1343.
56. Bloch-Wehba, Access to Algorithms, supra note 6, at 1272.
57. Okidegbe, supra note 18, at 768–69.
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As a result, while the advent of algorithmic governance might
once have been thought to increase participation and
responsiveness, today it appears to have the opposite effect. Critics
also contest whether algorithmic governance can deliver on its
promise of efficient, seamless, technology-aided decision-making.
Across the nation, state and local agencies’ adoption of automated
decision-making systems has given rise to substantial civil
litigation, calling into doubt assumptions that automation would
reduce friction and improve efficiency.58 Citron and Calo have also
cast doubt on claims that algorithmic decision-making has
substantially increased efficiency, writing that it instead has
“misallocated public resources” and “misdirect[ed] government
services.”59 At times, it is difficult to assess whether the deployment
of algorithmic decision-making has advanced efficiency at all.
B. Accuracy and Bias
Proponents of algorithmic governance tout its capacity to
improve the accuracy and objectivity of government decisions. For
instance, in the context of sentencing or pretrial release decisions,
automating some aspects of decision-making might make judges
less likely to release or “under-punish” those who are likely to
reoffend, and might prevent “over-punishing” or detaining
individuals who pose a minimal risk to society.60 Both of these
claimed benefits relate to the drawbacks of human decisionmaking: “people dissemble, obfuscate, and lie,” and they may not
even be able to articulate reasons for the decisions they make.61
Boosters of algorithmic governance claim that “scientific,”
“actuarial,” or mechanized decision-making methods have

58. See, e.g., Calo & Citron, supra note 30, at 820–23 (describing litigation against the
Arkansas Department of Human Services); Alejandro de la Garza, States’ Automated Systems
Are Trapping Citizens in Bureaucratic Nightmares with Their Lives on the Line, TIME (May 28,
2020, 2:24 PM), https://time.com/5840609/algorithm-unemployment/.
59. Calo & Citron, supra note 30, at 819.
60. Anne Milgram, Alexander M. Holsinger, Marie Vannostrand & Matthew W.
Alsdorf, Pretrial Risk Assessment: Improving Public Safety and Fairness in Pretrial Decision
Making, 27 FED. SENT’G REP. 216, 219 (2015); Kelly Hannah-Moffat, The Uncertainties of Risk
Assessment: Partiality, Transparency, and Just Decisions, 27 FED. SENT’G REP. 244, 244–45 (2015).
61. Kleinberg et al., supra note 30, at 4.
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improved accuracy and objectivity.62 Critics, on the other hand, have
long been skeptical.63
Some of these problems rest on faulty data sources. Machinelearning algorithms are trained to make decisions based on data
that reflect past decisions. In order for algorithmic predictions to be
accurate, the data that they operate on must be accurate as well. But
in certain high-stakes settings, such as policing, major questions
exist about the accuracy of the data underlying algorithmic systems
and the political imperatives that might distort it.64 Law
enforcement might, for example, fail to collect accurate data, either
purposefully or by omission.65 The problem of “dirty data”
predates the advent of AI tools in government. Today, however, the
problem of missing and inaccurate data remains pervasive.
But even data that are apparently complete or “accurate” can
reflect social and racial biases and disparities, further calling
claims of accuracy into question. A by-now standard critique
of government’s embrace of automation emphasizes that
algorithms—despite what is often described as a “veneer of expertise
and objectivity”—often reflect and even amplify racial and gender
bias when working as designed.66 For example, Joy Buolamwini and
Timnit Gebru demonstrated that facial recognition algorithms err
most significantly when trying to classify dark-skinned female

62. Paul E. Meehl, Empirical Comparisons of Clinical and Actuarial Prediction, in CLINICAL
VERSUS STATISTICAL PREDICTION: A THEORETICAL ANALYSIS AND A REVIEW OF THE EVIDENCE
83, 83–128 (1954); Richard Berk & Jordan Hyatt, Machine Learning Forecasts of Risk to Inform
Sentencing Decisions, 27 FED. SENT’G REP. 222, 227 (2015).
63. See, e.g., Sonja B. Starr, Evidence-Based Sentencing and the Scientific Rationalization of
Discrimination, 66 STAN. L. REV. 803, 842 (2014).
64. Rashida Richardson, Jason M. Schultz & Kate Crawford, Dirty Data, Bad
Predictions: How Civil Rights Violations Impact Police Data, Predictive Policing Systems, and
Justice, 94 N.Y.U. L. REV. ONLINE 15, 18 (2019) (defining “dirty data” to include “missing data,
wrong data, and non-standard representations of the same data[,]” as well as data that “is
derived from or influenced by corrupt, biased, and unlawful practices”).
65. Floyd v. City of New York, 959 F. Supp. 2d 540, 659–60 (S.D.N.Y 2013);
Anita Chabria, Kevin Rector & Cindy Chang, California Bars Police from Using LAPD Records
in Gang Database. Critics Want It Axed, L.A. TIMES (July 14, 2020), https://www.latimes.com/
california/story/2020-07-14/california-bars-police-from-using-lapd-records-in-gangdatabase-as-scandal-widens (reporting that, in 2020, the State of California barred access
to records in a statewide gang database generated by the Los Angeles Police Department
after an audit revealed that the department’s entries were “inconsistent, unreliable
and unpredictable”).
66. Aziz Z. Huq, A Right to a Human Decision, 106 VA. L. REV. 611, 681–82 (2020).
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people, and err least when trying to classify light-skinned male
people.67 Indeed, algorithmic decision-making can both rely
upon and reproduce existing bias. In the context of criminal
law enforcement, for instance, what Dorothy Roberts describes
as “institutionally biased” crime data reflects police practices
that disproportionately surveil, monitor, and punish African
Americans.68 And, as Ngozi Okidegbe has argued, there is an even
deeper-rooted epistemic flaw at the heart of many algorithms used
in criminal law enforcement contexts: algorithms rely on data
generated exclusively from “carceral knowledge sources,” and
systematically exclude “community knowledge sources” as “noncredible.”69 Thus, it appears that the promises of objectivity and
accuracy may fall short.70
The core ideas of algorithmic inaccuracy and bias can be
deceptively alluring. To the extent that algorithmic inaccuracy and
bias rest on faulty data sources, techno-optimists can reframe
debates about the social impact of algorithmic governance as ones
to be solved by technology itself.71 Likewise, if algorithmic

67. Joy Buolamwini & Timnit Gebru, Gender Shades: Intersectional Accuracy Disparities
in Commercial Gender Classification, 81 PROC. MACH. LEARNING RSCH. 1, 12 (2018).
68. Dorothy E. Roberts, Abolition Constitutionalism, 133 HARV. L. REV. 1, 28–29 (2019).
Other scholars have considered the influence of institutional bias in the employment context.
E.g., Ajunwa, The Paradox of Automation, supra note 19, at 1673–74 (citing the example of
Amazon, which had to discard an automated hiring algorithm after it turned out that, based
on historical patterns of male dominance in the job application and hiring process, the
artificial intelligence program was systematically downgrading female applicants); see also
Stephanie Bornstein, Antidiscriminatory Algorithms, 70 ALA. L. REV. 519, 521 (2018) (making
similar claims).
69. Ngozi Okidegbe, Discredited Data, 107 CORNELL L. REV. (forthcoming 2022)
(manuscript at 42–43) (on file with author).
70. It is also difficult for researchers to vet claims that AI/ML are “more accurate”
than human decision makers at all. As Megan Stevenson notes, empirical studies that
compare human decision makers with algorithmic outcomes are fraught with
methodological difficulties. Megan Stevenson, Assessing Risk Assessment in Action, 103 MINN.
L. REV. 303, 322–27 (2018). Rigorous empirical study of algorithmic decision-making may be
particularly difficult to undertake in legal environments in light of the longstanding aversion
of the legal profession to randomized controlled trials. D. James Greiner & Andrea
Matthews, Randomized Control Trials in the United States Legal Profession, 12 ANNU. REV. L.
SOC. SCI. 295, 296 (2016); H. Fernandez Lynch, D. J. Greiner & I. G. Cohen, Overcoming
Obstacles to Experiments in Legal Practice, 367 SCIENCE 1078, 1080 (2020).
71. Okidegbe, supra note 69, at 26–27 (describing how the “biased data diagnosis has
encouraged technocrats to focus on the data currently used in algorithmic systems”).
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unfairness amplifies preexisting social, racial, and gender biases,
optimists can point to more “objective” decision-making
mechanisms as a way to consign those problems to the dustbin.
But problems of bias also run deeper than data flaws, to a frame
of reference that centers on combatting individual prejudice while
turning a blind eye to systemic unfairness. 72 Ifeoma Ajunwa has
described this phenomenon of “algorithmic capture” as the
“combined effect of the belief that algorithms are more efficient and
fairer and the abdication of human accountability for undesirable
outcomes.”73 Examining how algorithmic governance rests upon,
produces, and reproduces unfairness suggests that technical fixes,
no matter how sophisticated, are unlikely to address these
underlying systemic problems in a satisfying way.74
C. Accountability and Transparency
In recent years, a rich vein of scholarship has explored
how AI can be made to render decisions that are “accountable”
to their subjects. From a legal perspective, Danielle Citron’s
prescient Technological Due Process set the stage by observing that
automated decision-making processes would have dramatic
consequences for accountability in the contexts of both rulemaking
and adjudication.75 Some scholars argue that current algorithmic
systems more than satisfy existing accountability and transparency
obligations and principles.76 Others are optimistic that algorithms
may actually improve accountability and transparency. They argue
that compared to human decision-making—hardly a beacon of
light—automation might be more transparent, not less.77 And

72. Ifeoma Ajunwa, An Auditing Imperative for Automated Hiring Systems, 34 HARV. J.L.
& TECH. 621, 639 (2021).
73. Ajunwa, The Pardox of Automation, supra note 19, at 1692.
74. See, e.g., Anna Lauren Hoffmann, Where Fairness Fails: Data, Algorithms, and the Limits
of Antidiscrimination Discourse, 22 INFO., COMMC’N & SOC’Y 900, 903–04 (2019) (describing how
“antidiscrimination discourse” focuses on “discrete ‘bad actors’ . . . [i]nstead of addressing
pernicious social and systemic injustices”).
75. Citron, supra note 30.
76. See generally Cary Coglianese & David Lehr, Transparency and Algorithmic
Governance, 71 ADMIN. L. REV. 1 (2019) (arguing that “responsible governments can provide
sufficient transparency about their use of algorithms to supplement, and possibly even
replace, human judgments”).
77. Kleinberg et al., supra note 30, at 4.
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digital technologies used by government might also be used to
monitor the government itself and understand, for example, “the
choices police make on a daily basis.”78 Existing accountability
obligations assume that decisions are made by humans who can
provide justifications for their actions; automated systems that
obscure the justifications for decisions make these obligations
difficult to meet.79 But some have argued that careful design choices
can make algorithms “provably accountable.”80
Still, most commentators appear more inclined to believe that
new data-driven governance practices will undermine, not
promote, transparency and accountability. In Technological Due
Process, Citron noted that significant accountability deficits arise
when government agencies rely on automated systems that might
invisibly “depart from formal policy.”81 In later work, Citron and
Ryan Calo contend that the accountability deficits run even deeper,
exposing growing gaps in the expertise of the administrative
state.82 A robust literature considers whether there is something
exceptional about human decision-making that would make it
desirable to maintain human-led administrative processes in the
face of the promised efficiency gains of automation.83 Likewise,
scholars of science, technology and society have stressed the
importance of maintaining a “human in the loop” in order to ensure

78. Andrew Guthrie Ferguson, The Exclusionary Rule in the Age of Blue Data, 72 VAND.
L. REV. 561, 607 (2019).
79. See generally Kroll et al., supra note 27, at 636.
80. Id. at 641.
81. Citron, supra note 30, at 1295. Other scholars have expressed similar concerns
about how automated systems might expand agency discretion beyond its lawful bounds.
See, e.g., Mulligan and Bamberger, supra note 17, at 794–98; Berman, supra note 30, at 1312.
82. Calo and Citron, supra note 30, at 818.
83. See, e.g., Rebecca Crootof, “Cyborg Justice” and the Risk of Technological-Legal Lockin, 119 COLUM. L. REV. ONLINE 233, 236–38 (2019); Kaminski, supra note 27, at 1594 (describing
how the European Union’s General Data Protection Regulation sets forth “the right to ‘obtain
human intervention’ in an algorithmic decision”); Richard M. Re & Alicia Solow-Niederman,
Developing Artificially Intelligent Justice, 22 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 242, 255 (2019) (“The main
strengths of Al adjudication are two hallmarks of codified justice: efficiency (or elimination
of waste) and uniformity (or elimination of bias and arbitrariness).”); Huq, supra note 66, at
637–40; Eugene Volokh, Chief Justice Robots, 68 DUKE L.J. 1135, 1161–66 (2019); BrennanMarquez & Henderson, supra note 30, at 146–48.
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that decision makers are ultimately “accountable” to the subjects of
algorithmic decisions.84
Optimism about potential technological fixes for opaque,
unaccountable algorithms still abounds in industry and in technical
fields.85 Some scholars have considered whether artificial
intelligence might be able to make key information about its inner
workings available to affected individuals without compromising
trade secrecy and confidentiality interests.86 In the tech industry,
firms are adopting principles of ethical AI, transparency, and
accountability that, they say, will advance these values from within.87
But in contexts that are already suffering from severe
accountability and transparency deficits, technological improvements
to transparency are marginal. In “low-rights” contexts such as
criminal law enforcement, the border, and national security,
unilateral promises of ethics, accountability, and transparency can
hardly reassure either policymakers or citizens that technology is
functioning as it should.88 AI is frequently used in the context of
law enforcement and national security programs that have only
grown more secretive and less transparent over time.89 Indeed, as
automation promises to expand the capacity and efficiency of the law
enforcement apparatus, questions about algorithmic accountability
84. Bettina Berendt & Sören Preibusch, Toward Accountable Discrimination-Aware Data
Mining: The Importance of Keeping the Human in the Loop—and Under the Looking Glass, 5 BIG
DATA 135 (2017) (arguing for a deeper understanding of the human side of decision-making
with data mining); Meg Leta Jones, The Right to a Human in the Loop: Political Constructions of
Computer Automation and Personhood, 47 SOC. STUD. SCI. 216, 230 (2017) (describing European
“insistence on the categorization of . . . a human in the loop as a fundamental right”)
(emphasis added).
85. See generally FRANK PASQUALE, NEW LAWS OF ROBOTICS 123 (2020) (describing this
inclination as “technophilic”).
86. Kroll et al., supra note 27, at 658–60; see also Andrew D. Selbst & Solon Barocas, The
Intuitive Appeal of Explainable Machines, 87 FORDHAM L. REV. 1085, 1135 (2018).
87. See infra Part III.A.
88. EUBANKS, supra note 19, at 12 (describing how automated systems are piloted in
contexts targeting the poor).
89. Andrew D. Selbst, Disparate Impact in Big Data Policing, 52 GA. L. REV. 109, 113–14
(2017) (describing predictive policing as a “particularly important area” of technological
adoption); see also David E. Pozen, Transparency’s Ideological Drift, 128 YALE L.J. 100, 156 (2018)
(describing how, in the context of national security, transparency law “grew increasingly
detached from the state’s most violent and least visible components[,]” casting doubt on the
promise that freedom of information laws could effectively check national security abuses);
Christina Koningisor, Secrecy Creep, 169 U. PA. L. REV. 1751 (2021) (describing how national
security secrecy has migrated into state and local law enforcement domains).
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and transparency begin to merge with broader questions about how
best to reduce, control, or eliminate state violence.90
II. A BOTTOM-UP VISION FOR ALGORITHMIC GOVERNANCE
As automated decision-making has become a key tool for
governance, concerns about the values reflected in AI have grown.
The use of algorithms to dole out access to goods and services,
allocate opportunities, and mete out punishment has prompted
backlash and mobilization in a variety of contexts.91 Resistance to
the new technological modalities of surveillance draws on the
kinds of concerns about accountability, bias, accuracy, and
transparency outlined in the previous Part. Yet social and labor
movement activists reject bureaucratic oversight, legal
accountability, and electoral safeguards as the chief mechanisms to
constrain algorithmic governance. Instead, bottom-up activism
turns to more direct resistance strategies to compel change:
walkouts, protests, and union drives.
Just as algorithmic governance involves significant participation
by both public- and private-sector actors, activists call for both the
public and private sectors to respond to their demands.92 The turn
toward bottom-up activism reflects demands for democratic

90. Garfield Benjamin, “Put It in the Bin:” Mapping AI as a Framework of Refusal,
RESISTANCEAI WORKSHOP AT THE 34TH CONFERENCE ON NEURAL INFORMATION PROCESSING
SYSTEMS (2020) (using the example of live facial recognition technology).
91. See, e.g., Nanette Asimov, How Stanford’s Vaccine Algorithm Caused a Major Controversy
and Left Frontline Workers at the Back of the Line, S.F. CHRON. (Dec. 25, 2020, 7:20 PM),
https://www.sfchronicle.com/health/article/How-Stanford-s-vaccine-algorithm-causeda-major-15824918.php; Henry McDonald, Home Office to Scrap “Racist Algorithm” for UK
Visa Applicants, GUARDIAN (Aug. 4, 2020, 7:47 AM), http://www.theguardian.com/
uk-news/2020/aug/04/home-office-to-scrap-racist-algorithm-for-uk-visa-applicants;
Louise Amoore, Why “Ditch the Algorithm” is the Future of Political Protest, GUARDIAN (Aug. 19,
2020, 6:47 AM), http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2020/aug/19/ditch-thealgorithm-generation-students-a-levels-politics; Chris Palmer & Claudia Irizarry-Aponte,
Dozens of Speakers at Hearing Assail Pa. Plan to Use Algorithm in Sentencing, PHILA. INQUIRER (June
6,
2018),
https://www.inquirer.com/philly/news/crime/philadelphia-pennsylvaniaalgorithm-sentencing-public-hearing-20180606.html.
92. See Chelsea Barabas, Colin Doyle, JB Rubinovitz & Karthik Dinakar, Studying Up:
Reorienting the Study of Algorithmic Fairness Around Issues of Power, in ACM CONFERENCE ON
FAIRNESS, ACCOUNTABILITY, AND TRANSPARENCY 167, 174–75 (2020); Ben Tarnoff, Trump’s
Tech Opposition, JACOBIN (May 2, 2017), https://jacobinmag.com/2017/05/tech-workerssilicon-valley-trump-resistance-startups-unions.
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control that go beyond formal public institutions, extending to the
private sector companies that might once have thought themselves
beyond democracy’s reach.93
With private authority embedded in public governance, both
private and public institutions are now vulnerable to calls for
democratic control.94 This entwinement creates new opportunities
for tech workers to organize and work in parallel with labor and
social movements against firms’ provision of algorithmic
governance to the state. Yet existing legal scholarship has
overlooked the democratic significance of the emerging techworker movement, even as scholars appreciate the movement’s
salience to corporate governance and to labor law. Legal scholars
have described worker mobilization in the technology sector as a form
of “private ordering” and as a call for higher “ethical standards” in the
private sector.95 While significant, these descriptions are incomplete:
they fail to appreciate the broader ambition of workers mobilizing in
solidarity with other movements.
Using three case studies, this Part examines how tech workers,
alongside movements for social and racial justice, are demanding
accountability not just from government institutions but also from
the private firms that build and sell tech to government customers.
Together, social movements and tech workers oppose the
embeddedness of tech firms within the most violent and repressive
government practices and programs. In so doing, they challenge
both the disempowerment of the tech workers who were “exclu[ded]
from real decision-making” about collaboration with government
programs, as well as the deployment of new technologies of
governance to further exclude, marginalize, and oppress people
and communities.96

93. Cf. ELIZABETH ANDERSON, PRIVATE GOVERNMENT: HOW EMPLOYERS RULE OUR
LIVES (AND WHY WE DON’T TALK ABOUT IT) 47–48 (2017); Bowie, supra note 15 (describing
recent movements to democratize the workplace).
94. COHEN, supra note 54, at 187.
95. Jennifer S. Fan, Employees as Regulators: The New Private Ordering in High
Technology Companies, 2019 U TAH L. R EV. 973, 1015–17 (2019); Kelley Changfong-Hagen,
“Don’t Be Evil”: Collective Action and Employee Prosocial Activism, 5 C OLUM. H UM. R TS. L.
R EV. O NLINE 188, 190 (2021).
96. Ben Tarnoff, The Making of the Tech Worker Movement, LOGIC (May 4, 2020),
https://logicmag.io/the-making-of-the-tech-worker-movement/full-text/.
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A. National Security Surveillance
National security was perhaps the first setting for widespread
adoption of algorithmic governance. In the wake of the September
11, 2001, attacks, the Department of Defense created the
“Orwellian-sounding” Total Information Awareness System (TIA),
which linked multiple sources of information and intelligence in
one centralized location.97 From the outset, the growth of the
national security surveillance state required extensive cooperation
from the tech industry. In connection with the TIA, the Defense
Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) sought proposals
for large-scale data storage as well as technologies that would
“allow humans and machines to think together about complicated
and complex problems more efficiently and effectively.”98 Defense
firms and other private actors also secured grants to support the
TIA project.99 Congress cut off funding for TIA in 2003, after it had
barely gotten off the ground.100 Nonetheless, the kinds of data
mining and analysis techniques used in connection with TIA soon
metastasized to other locations in the defense and law enforcement
context.101 Later revelations about other dragnet surveillance
programs have also spawned comparisons with TIA.102
At first, the private sector provided little resistance.
The defense contractors that had partnered with DARPA in the
initial stages of TIA were hardly hotbeds of progressive antisurveillance sentiment. But acquiring the raw materials for data
mining and surveillance also required partnerships with other

97. Ferguson, Big Data, supra note 30, at 361.
98. EPIC Analysis of Total Information Awareness Contractor Documents, EPIC (Feb.
2003), https://www.epic.org/privacy/profiling/tia/doc_analysis.html.
99. Approved Contractors for BAA-02-08: Total Information Awareness, EPIC,
https://www.epic.org/privacy/profiling/tia/contractors_table.html (last visited Sept.
23, 2022).
100. Christopher Slobogin, Government Data Mining and the Fourth Amendment, 75 U.
CHI. L. REV. 317, 317–18 (2008).
101. Id. at 319 (“The Defense Department, the progenitor of TIA, sponsors the largest
number of data mining operations.”).
102. See, e.g., Siobhan Gorman, NSA’s Domestic Spying Grows as Agency Sweeps Up Data;
Terror Fight Blurs Line Over Domain; Tracking Email, WALL ST. J. (Mar. 10, 2008, 12:01 AM),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB120511973377523845 (describing how, when TIA ended,
some of its research and technology was “shifted to the NSA”).

91

2.BLOCHWEHBA.FIN.NH.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

12/10/22 7:19 PM

48:1 (2022)

firms that could facilitate access to large amounts of user data.103
Telecommunications companies collaborated willingly with
national security agencies, while some Silicon Valley technology
companies began to resist and push back, albeit often in secretive
judicial proceedings.104 Moreover, firms’ partnerships with law
enforcement and intelligence were not popular with all of their
employees. In 2006, in what was perhaps the first example of a
private-sector employee blowing the whistle on a national security
program, Mark Klein, an AT&T technician, leaked information
about the firm’s cooperation with the National Security Agency
to WIRED.105
Movements for social and racial justice began to coalesce in
response to revelations about tech-enabled national security
surveillance. For instance, beginning in 2011, the Associated Press
published a series of stories revealing that the New York Police
Department (NYPD), in partnership with the CIA, had
systematically surveilled Muslim communities in New York.106
In response, a group of Muslim individuals, Muslim-owned
businesses, mosques, and the Muslim Students Association filed a
lawsuit challenging NYPD’s surveillance on First Amendment and
equal protection grounds.107 The New York City grassroots group
Desis Rising Up and Moving (DRUM) began a series of projects
103. Jack M. Balkin, Old-School/New-School Speech Regulation, 127 HARV. L. REV. 2296,
2329 (2014) (“[I]n order to engage in surveillance, the government needs access to the
facilities through which most people are speaking; hence the government needs access to the
infrastructure of free expression, which is largely held in private hands.”).
104. Jon D. Michaels, All the President’s Spies: Private-Public Intelligence Partnerships in
the War on Terror, 96 CALIF. L. REV. 901, 911 (2008) (describing “the telecommunications
companies’ complicity” in the warrantless wiretapping program). For examples of tech firm
pushback, see, e.g., In re Directives to Yahoo! Inc. Pursuant to Section 105B of the Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Act, No. 08-01, 2008 WL 10632524 (Foreign Intel. Surveillance Ct.
Aug. 22, 2008); In re Nat’l Sec. Letter, 863 F.3d 1110 (9th Cir. 2017).
105. David Kravets, NSA Leak Vindicates AT&T Whistleblower, WIRED (June 27, 2013,
3:09 PM), https://www.wired.com/2013/06/nsa-whistleblower-klein/; see also Michael
German, Protecting Whistleblowers Protects National Security, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST.
(Mar. 5, 2015), https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/analysis-opinion/protectingwhistleblowers-protects-national-security (describing whistleblowing activities by Babak
Pasdar, a contractor with Verizon Wireless who discovered a circuit that connected the
company’s data to FBI headquarters).
106. See, e.g., Adam Goldman & Matt Apuzzo, Inside the Spy Unit that NYPD Says
Doesn’t Exist, ASSOCIATED PRESS (Aug. 31, 2011), https://www.nbcnewyork.com/
news/local/nypd-spy-terrorism-muslim-cia/1927513/.
107. Hassan v. City of New York, 804 F.3d 277 (3d Cir. 2015).
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advocating for changes to local and national surveillance
programs.108 But in 2012, NYPD announced that Microsoft was
building a new Domain Awareness System for the department to
conduct round-the-clock aggregation and analysis of information
from video sources, license plate readers, and criminal databases,
among other sources.109 The new incarnation of technologicallyfacilitated counterterrorism surveillance raised concerns that it
would amplify the same kinds of racial and religious profiling
practices NYPD had long been engaging in.110
Today, tech workers seem increasingly hostile to partnerships
such as Total Information Awareness or the Domain Awareness
System. Consider “Project Maven,” a Department of Defense
program that sought to deploy artificial intelligence for video
analysis.111 Project Maven began in 2017, when the Department
launched its Algorithmic Warfare Cross-Functional Team.112 In a
2017 event, Defense Department officials publicly commented
about the potential of computer vision and artificial intelligence for
combat and intelligence-related purposes, acknowledging that the
emerging focus on AI would require significant investment by the
government as well as participation by the private sector.113 In
March 2018, Gizmodo and The Intercept reported that Google had
entered into a contract with the Department of Defense to supply

108. Racial & Immigrant Justice Program, DRUM (Oct. 5, 2012), https://www.drumnyc.org/
racial-immigrant-justice-program/.
109. I. Bennett Capers, Crime, Surveillance, and Communities, 40 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 959,
960–61 (2013).
110. Michael McLaughlin, John Liu Investigates NYPD Surveillance of Muslims, Mosques,
HUFFINGTON POST (Aug. 28, 2013, 5:20 PM), https://www.huffpost.com/entry/john-liunypd-muslims_n_3831681.
111. Scott Shane, Cade Metz & Daisuke Wakabayashi, How a Pentagon Contract
Became an Identity Crisis for Google, N.Y. TIMES (May 30, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/
2018/05/30/technology/google-project-maven-pentagon.html.
112. Dell Cameron & Kate Conger, Google Is Helping the Pentagon Build AI for Drones,
GIZMODO (Mar. 6, 2018, 10:15 AM), https://gizmodo.com/google-is-helping-the-pentagonbuild-ai-for-drones-1823464533.
113. Cheryl Pellerin, Project Maven to Deploy Computer Algorithms to War Zone by Year’s
End, U.S. DEP’T DEF. (July 21, 2017), https://www.defense.gov/Explore/
News/Article/Article/1254719/project-maven-to-deploy-computer-algorithms-to-warzone-by-years-end/.
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artificial intelligence that would interpret drone footage and help
“track individuals as they come and go from different locations.”114
The disclosure that Google was helping the Department of
Defense conduct bomb strikes raised the hackles of Google
employees.115 The Project Maven story broke as Google was also
grappling with internal dissatisfaction over the company’s
mishandling of sexual harassment complaints.116 Thousands of
employees signed onto an open letter drafted by Meredith
Whittaker, who led the Open Research Group at the firm,
protesting the contract and demanding that the company desist
from providing “warfare technology.”117 The firm’s tepid response,
which sought to reassure Google employees that the Maven
contract was uncontroversial, had the opposite effect, bolstering
support for Whittaker and eroding confidence in Google’s
leadership.118 In May 2018, Google removed its famous corporate
tagline, “don’t be evil,” from its code of conduct.119 Shortly
thereafter, the firm announced that it would not renew its Project
Maven contract.120
Project Maven illustrates the democratic vision’s breadth. The
dominant critiques of algorithmic governance focus on errors and
problems that are internal to technical systems. For example, the
argument for a “human in the loop” rests on the perception that
humans might be able to flag context, errors, or interpretations that

114. Cameron & Conger, supra note 112; Lee Fang, Google Is Quietly Providing AI
Technology for Drone Strike Targeting Project, THE INTERCEPT (Mar. 6, 2018, 11:40 AM),
https://theintercept.com/2018/03/06/google-is-quietly-providing-ai-technology-fordrone-strike-targeting-project/.
115. Fang, supra note 114.
116. Kate Conger & Noam Scheiber, Federal Labor Agency Says Google Wrongly Fired 2
Employees, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 2, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/12/02/
technology/google-nlrb-fired-workers.html.
117. Shane et al., supra note 111.
118. Conger & Scheiber, supra note 116.
119. Kate Conger, Google Removes ‘Don’t Be Evil’ Clause from Its Code of Conduct,
GIZMODO (May 18, 2018, 5:31 PM), https://gizmodo.com/google-removes-nearly-allmentions-of-dont-be-evil-from-1826153393.
120. Daisuke Wakabayashi & Scott Shane, Google Will Not Renew Pentagon Contract That
Upset Employees, N.Y. TIMES (June 1, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/
06/01/technology/google-pentagon-project-maven.html.
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machines currently cannot.121 In contrast, the democratic vision
might also see Google employees resisting Project Maven as
playing a role as “humans in the loop.” But the loop is much larger
than any single, individual automated decision: the Project Maven
example highlights the significance of human resistance against the
adoption of an automated system in the first place. In other words,
the democratic vision might be understood to expand the role of
human judgment beyond the scope of isolated decisions and to inform
the determination of whether, when, and under what circumstances
algorithmic governance is consistent with human values.
The Maven example also underscores the potential power and
promise of organizing, even as Google exploited scant protections
for labor and retaliated against many of its employees.122 When
Google employees unionized in January 2021, they cited Project
Maven as one example of successful worker mobilization,
alongside higher wage for subcontractors and an end to the forced
arbitration of sexual harassment claims.123 Vocal employee
resistance raised public awareness of projects that might otherwise
have been swept under the rug and made internal conflicts over the
company’s policies visible to an external audience. In a context
in which it is “difficult to obtain reliable publicly available
information” from the government itself, worker advocacy can
make secretive government programs more salient to the public.124
Indeed, at the time of writing, Google and Amazon workers have

121. Brennan-Marquez & Henderson, supra note 30, at 146; Anna Brown, Alexandra
Chouldechova, Emily Putnam-Hornstein, Andrew Tobin & Rhema Vaithianathan, Toward
Algorithmic Accountability in Public Services: A Qualitative Study of Affected Community
Perspectives on Algorithmic Decision-making in Child Welfare Services, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE
2019 CHI CONFERENCE ON HUMAN FACTORS IN COMPUTING SYSTEMS PROCEEDINGS - CHI ‘19
1–12 (2019) (“While algorithmic risk scores were perceived as potentially helpful as a starting
point, they were generally deemed to be an inadequate basis for ultimate decision-making.”).
122. Conger & Scheiber, supra note 116; Kate Conger & Cade Metz, “I Could Solve Most
of Your Problems”: Eric Schmidt’s Pentagon Offensive, N.Y. TIMES (May 2, 2020),
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/05/02/technology/eric-schmidt-pentagon-google.html.
123. Parul Koul & Chewy Shaw, We Built Google. This Is Not the Company We Want to Work
For., N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 4, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/01/04/opinion/
google-union.html.
124. Engstrom et al., supra note 40, at 12.
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walked out of the workplace once again, this time to protest their
employers’ cloud contracts with the Israeli government.125
At the same time, the narrow victories of Google workers also
illustrate the limits of worker mobilization. Returning to the
example of the NYPD, the Domain Awareness System remains an
important tool for the agency even after the unit that had conducted
the Muslim surveillance programs was officially disbanded in
2014.126 Strikingly, Microsoft’s role in supplying the NYPD with
surveillance tools has not generated controversy within its
workforce. Nor do firms such as ShotSpotter, which provides New
York and other cities with “gunshot detection” sensors and
software, or Vigilant Solutions, which supplies license plate
readers, appear to be roiled by worker concerns.127 Perhaps because
government contracts make up a significant portion of these firms’
revenues, workers are less likely to resist or reconsider the
provision of surveillance technology to public partners.128
While tech workers and social movements have made some
very public gains in opposing algorithmic governance in national
security contexts, the overall effectiveness of these mobilizations
thus appears uneven.
B. Facial Recognition Technology
As surveillance techniques and technologies have migrated
from the national security domain to more everyday policing
contexts, relationships between tech workers and grassroots social
movements have only grown more entwined. Consider the role of
social and labor movements in opposing facial recognition
125. Amanda Silberling, Google Workers Protest $1.2B Project Nimbus Contract with Israeli
Military, TECHCRUNCH (Sept. 1, 2022), https://techcrunch.com/2022/09/01/googleworkers-protest-1-2b-project-nimbus-contract-with-israeli-military/.
126. Matt Apuzzo & Joseph Goldstein, New York Drops Unit That Spied on Muslims, N.Y.
TIMES (Apr. 15, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/04/16/nyregion/police-unit-thatspied-on-muslims-is-disbanded.html; Domain Awareness System (DAS): Impact & Use Policy,
NYPD (Apr. 11, 2021), www1.nyc.gov/assets/nypd/downloads/pdf/public_information/
post-final/domain-awareness-system-das-nypd-impact-and-use-policy_4.9.21_final.pdf.
127. Bloch-Wehba, Access to Algorithms, supra note 6, at 1283–84 (describing
ShotSpotter); Amanda Levendowski, Trademarks as Surveillance Transparency, 36 BERKELEY
TECH. L.J. 439, 457–63 (2021) (describing Vigilant Solutions’s provision of license plate
recognition cameras and software).
128. See, e.g., Microsoft Q4 10-K (2020), 29 (“We derive substantial revenue from
government contracts.”).
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technology (FRT). FRT is an investigative tool that uses a
computer algorithm to screen a photograph against a database of
images and return a list of probable matches.129 These algorithms
frequently use a form of machine learning called “deep learning,”
which tends to provide “limited insights into the decision-making
process.”130 The great appeal of FRT is efficiency: the technology
can help “maximize limited resources” by permitting law
enforcement to “expedite[] certain police functions.”131 While
policing provides the most salient use case for FRT, private actors
also use the technology.132
Police use of FRT has garnered special attention and concern in
light of problems with accuracy and bias.133 To understand the
stakes, consider the story of Robert Williams. In January 2020,
Mr. Williams was arrested after a facial recognition system
129. PATRICK GROTHER, MEI NGAN & KAYEE HANAOKA, U.S. DEP’T OF COM.,
FACE RECOGNITION VENDOR TEST (FVRT) PART 3: DEMOGRAPHIC EFFECTS (2019).
130. Shruti Nagpal, Maneet Singh, Richa Singh & Mayank Vatsa, Deep Learning for Face
Recognition: Pride or Prejudiced?, PROC. OF THE AAAI CONF. ON A.I. (Apr. 3, 2020),
https://ojs.aaai.org//index.php/AAAI/article/view/7085.
131. Law Enforcement Facial Recognition Use Case Catalog, at 1, IJIS INSTITUTE
(Mar. 2019), https://www.theiacp.org/sites/default/files/2019-10/IJIS_IACP%20WP_
LEITTF_Facial%20Recognition%20UseCasesRpt_20190322.pdf; see also Shannon Togawa
Mercer & Ashley Deeks, Facial Recognition Software: Costs and Benefits, LAWFARE BLOG (Mar.
27, 2018, 9:00 AM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/facial-recognition-software-costsand-benefits (arguing that the most promising benefit of FRT is that it “can make law
enforcement more efficient”).
132. See, e.g., Mike Rogoway, Major Tech Company Using Facial Recognition to ID
Workers, GOV’T TECH. (Mar. 11, 2020), https://www.govtech.com/public-safety/
Major-Tech-Company-Using-Facial-Recognition-to-ID-Workers.html;
Nick
Tabor,
Smile! The Secretive Business of Facial-Recognition Software in Retail Stores, N.Y. MAG.
(Oct. 20, 2018), https://nymag.com/intelligencer/2018/10/retailers-are-using-facialrecognition-technology-too.html; Kashmir Hill, Before Clearview Became a Police
Tool, It Was a Secret Plaything of the Rich, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 6, 2020),
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/03/05/technology/clearview-investors.html; Rachel
Metz, Anyone Can Use This Powerful Facial-recognition Tool — and That’s a Problem, CNN
(May
4,
2021,
3:53
PM),
https://www.cnn.com/2021/05/04/tech/pimeyesfacial-recognition/index.html; Yasmin Gagne, How We Fought Our Landlord’s Secretive
Plan for Facial Recognition—and Won, FAST COMPANY (Nov. 22, 2019),
https://www.fastcompany.com/90431686/our-landlord-wants-to-install-facialrecognition-in-our-homes-but-were-fighting-back.
133. See, e.g., Madeleine Gregory, Amazon’s Facial Recognition Misidentified 1 in 5
California Lawmakers as Criminals, VICE (Aug. 13, 2019, 12:42 PM), https://www.vice.com
/en_us/article/ne8wa8/amazons-facial-recognition-misidentified-1-in-5-californialawmakers-as-criminals.
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wrongly flagged his old driver’s license photo as a match for an
individual suspected of shoplifting expensive watches at a Detroit
store known for its modern vintage aesthetic and its role in the
city’s “revitalization.”134 After holding Mr. Williams overnight,
detectives showed him a still image taken from the store’s
surveillance video system, and asked, “Is this you?” It was not
Mr. Williams, who was incredulous. “You think all black men look
alike?”135 Officers had run the photograph through a facial
recognition system, which flagged Mr. Williams’s driver’s license
photo as a potential match, and showed it to a loss-prevention
contractor, who wrongly identified Mr. Williams as the perpetrator.136
For Detroit activists, Mr. Williams’s arrest vividly illustrated
both the perils of racial bias embedded within FRT systems and
the failings of public oversight. Around the same time that
Mr. Williams’s arrest became national news, the uprisings against
police violence were coming to a head, and Detroit was due to
renew its contract with DataWorksPlus, a tech firm that provided a
platform for FRT to be used by the police.137 Detroit had been
using FRT for years, primarily in the context of Project Green
Light, a “public-private-community partnership” that had installed
surveillance cameras in neighborhoods around the city.138 Project
Green Light started in 2016 with eight gas stations that paid for
and mounted police-monitored surveillance cameras outside their
establishments.139 The partnership, which matched voluntary

134. Robert Williams, I Was Wrongfully Arrested Because of Facial Recognition. Why Are
Police Allowed
to Use It?, WASH. POST (June 24, 2020, 3:04
PM),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2020/06/24/i-was-wrongfully-arrestedbecause-facial-recognition-why-are-police-allowed-use-this-technology/; Stacy Perman, The
Real History of America’s Most Authentic Fake Brand, INC. MAG. (Apr. 2016),
https://www.inc.com/magazine/201604/stacy-perman/shinola-watch-historymanufacturing-heritage-brand.html.
135. Kashmir Hill, Wrongfully Accused by an Algorithm, N.Y. TIMES (June 24, 2020),
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/06/24/technology/facial-recognition-arrest.html.
136. Id.
137. M. L. Elrick, Detroit Protesters Take Fight Against Facial Recognition Tech to City
Leaders’ Homes, DETROIT FREE PRESS (June 15, 2020), https://www.freep.com/
story/news/local/michigan/detroit/2020/06/15/facial-recognition-deal-off-agendaprotesters-target-councilmembers/3191887001/ (describing the June 15 caravan).
138. Project Green Light Detroit, CITY OF DETROIT, https://detroitmi.gov/
departments/police-department/project-green-light-detroit (last visited Sept. 25, 2022).
139. Id.
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participation by private enterprise with police resources, was a novel
development for Detroit and quickly expanded.
Detroit adopted FRT technology long before determining how
to regulate it. In 2017, Detroit police started using FRT to analyze
the footage from the Project Green Light cameras, entering into a
contract worth $1 million with technology firm DataWorksPlus.140
DataWorks’s software incorporates algorithms developed by thirdparty tech companies such as Japanese software company NEC,
which provided the algorithm that led to Mr. Williams’s arrest.141
Detroit police had been deploying FRT for a full year and a half
before finally adopting a policy that governed its use in 2019.142
Debates about the Board of Police Commissioners’ role in
overseeing the technology grew so acrimonious that one police
commissioner was arrested during a meeting.143 By the summer of
2020, Project Green Light included hundreds of participating
businesses, and the City Council was considering a contract
extension for DataWorks.144
Activists organizing against police surveillance took the
contract debate as an opportune moment to advocate against
FRT.145 But tech workers have also opposed the sale of FRT to
140. Professional Services Contract Between City of Detroit, Michigan and DataWorks Plus
Contract No. 6000801, MUCKROCK (July 8, 2019), https://www.muckrock.com/foi/detroit314/facial-recognition-detroit-mi-76785/#file-808358.
141. Hill, supra note 135.
142. Tawana Petty, Detroit: On a Journey to Be Seen, DATA FOR BLACK LIVES BLOG (Mar.
5, 2021), https://blog.d4bl.org/detroit-on-a-journey-to-be-seen-2/ (“In 2019 Detroiters
learned that facial recognition technology had been part of the surveillance program since
2017.”); Christine Ferretti, Residents Urge City Council to Reject Proposed Facial Recognition
Contract Extension, DETROIT NEWS (June 16, 2020, 2:03 PM), https://www.detroitnews.com/
story/news/local/detroit-city/2020/06/16/residents-urge-city-council-reject-proposedfacial-recognition-contract/3197917001/; Violet Ikonomova, Video: Detroit Police
Commissioner Arrested During Meeting on Facial Recognition, DEADLINE DETROIT (July 12,
2019, 12:01 AM), https://www.deadlinedetroit.com/articles/22779/video_detroit_
police_commissioner_arrested_during_meeting_on_facial_recognition.
143. Violet Ikonomova, Detroit Police Board’s Power Questioned Amid Face-Recognition
Dispute, DEADLINE DETROIT (July 31, 2019, 8:34 AM), https://www.deadlinedetroit.com/
articles/22915/2019_recap_detroit_police_board_s_power_questioned_amid_facerecognition_dispute.
144. Elrick, supra note 137; Tawana Petty, Defending Black Lives Means Banning Facial
Recognition, WIRED (July 10, 2020), https://www.wired.com/story/defending-black-livesmeans-banning-facial-recognition/.
145. Petty, supra note 142.
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criminal law enforcement. In 2018, for example, Amazon workers
mounted an internal campaign to stop the firm from selling its FRT
system, Rekognition, to law enforcement.146 In an open letter,
workers emphasized that FRT facilitated large-scale monitoring of
the Black population and raised racial justice concerns. Workers
wrote, “As ethically concerned Amazonians, we demand a choice
in what we build, and a say in how it is used.”147 The letter had no
impact. Indeed, not only did Amazon continue to sell Rekognition
to police, but it also continued to partner with police to promote the
adoption of Ring, its home surveillance subsidiary.148
FRT’s dangerous potential became particularly apparent
during and after the 2020 uprisings against police violence and
repression that responded to Minneapolis police officer Derek
Chauvin’s killing of George Floyd. In addition to the obvious
costs to individual privacy, FRT systems also pose particular
risks to other civil liberties interests, including free expression.149
Civil liberties advocates had long warned about the potential for
FRT to identify participants in protests and demonstrations, raising
substantial concerns about First Amendment expressive and
associational rights.150 According to news reports, several law
146. Ali Breland, Amazon Employees Protest Sale of Facial Recognition Tech to Law
Enforcement, THE HILL (June 21, 2018, 9:00 PM), https://thehill.com/business-alobbying/393583-amazon-employees-protest-sale-of-facial-recognition-tech-to-law.
147. Ali Breland, Dear Jeff, SCRIBD, https://www.scribd.com/document/382334740/
Dear-Jeff (last visited Sept. 25, 2022).
148. Louise Matsakis, Cops Are Offering Ring Doorbell Cameras in Exchange for Info, WIRED
(Aug. 2, 2019, 8:31 PM), https://www.wired.com/story/cops-offering-ring-doorbellcameras-for-information/; Lauren Goode & Louise Matsakis, Amazon Doubles Down on Ring
Partnerships With Law Enforcement, WIRED (Jan. 7, 2020, 8:02 PM), https://www.wired.com/
story/ces-2020-amazon-defends-ring-police-partnerships/; John Herrman, Who’s Watching
Your Porch?, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 19, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/01/19/style/ringvideo-doorbell-home-security.html; Alfred Ng, Amazon’s Helping Police Build a Surveillance
Network with Ring Doorbells, CNET (June 5, 2019, 7:55 AM), https://www.cnet.com/
features/amazons-helping-police-build-a-surveillance-network-with-ring-doorbells/.
149. Because FRT systems are so easily concealed, scholars Woodrow Hartzog and
Evan Selinger have argued they will lead to a widespread chilling effect that “dampen[s]
expressive and religious conduct.” Woodrow Hartzog & Evan Selinger, Facial Recognition Is
the Perfect Tool for Oppression, MEDIUM (Aug. 2, 2018), https://medium.com/s/story/facialrecognition-is-the-perfect-tool-for-oppression-bc2a08f0fe66.
150. See, e.g., Roy Bragg, Show Your Face in Public: Smile, You’re on the Bad Guy Camera,
SAN ANTONIO EXPRESS-NEWS (Aug. 19, 2001); David Hench, Police Filming of Rally-Goers
Draws Concern, PORTLAND PRESS-HERALD (Oct. 20, 2002) (“[P]eace activists and civil
libertarians criticize the tactics as intimidating people who disagree with the government.”).
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enforcement agencies used FRT to identify and arrest people
accused of violence and property crime during the George Floyd
protests.151 Activists also reported that Amazon’s Ring cameras
were being used to monitor and surveil protests.152
Against this background, activists have continued to advocate
for law enforcement to abandon FRT and for technology companies
to abandon law enforcement customers. Events during the summer
of 2020 brought these pressures to a head, as tech workers became
increasingly aligned with social movements seeking racial justice.
In June 2020, Amazon put out a statement of support for protestors
against racial injustice. Some workers pushed back, arguing that,
by continuing to profit off of law enforcement adoption of its
technologies, the firm’s actions spoke louder than words.153 Days
later, after years of resisting advocates’ and organizers’ calls not to
sell Rekognition to law enforcement, Amazon abruptly changed its
tune, announcing that it would impose a yearlong moratorium on
sales of its FRT to police.154 IBM followed suit, announcing that it
would no longer make FRT for law enforcement applications, and

151. Richland County Sheriff’s Department, Richland, Columbia Police Use Facial
Recognition, Social Media in Protest Tied Arrests, THE STATE (Aug. 2, 2020, 5:00 AM),
https://www.thestate.com/news/local/crime/article244433082.html; Justin Jouvenal &
Spencer S. Hsu, Facial Recognition Used to Identify Lafayette Square Protester Accused of Assault,
WASH. POST (Nov. 2, 2020, 1:45 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/legalissues/facial-recognition-protests-lafayette-square/2020/11/02/64b03286-ec86-11ea-b4bc3a2098fc73d4_story.html.
152. Khaleda Rahman, Police are Monitoring Black Lives Matter Protests with Ring Doorbell
Data and Drones, Activists Say, NEWSWEEK (Aug. 9, 2020, 10:46 AM),
https://www.newsweek.com/amazon-ring-drones-monitor-protests-1523856;
Matthew
Guariglia & Dave Maass, LAPD Requested Ring Footage of Black Lives Matter Protests, EFF (Feb.
16, 2021), https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2021/02/lapd-requested-ring-footage-blacklives-matter-protests.
153. Isobel Asher Hamilton, Amazon Workers Slammed the Company for Supporting the
George Floyd Protesters While Still Flogging Surveillance Tech to Police, BUSINESS INSIDER (June
3, 2020, 6:04 AM), https://www.businessinsider.com/amazon-workers-accuse-companyhypocrisy-george-floyd-statement-2020-6.
154. Karen Hao, The Two-Year Fight to Stop Amazon from Selling Face Recognition to
the Police, MIT TECH. REV. (June 12, 2020), https://www.technologyreview.com/
2020/06/12/1003482/amazon-stopped-selling-police-face-recognition-fight/ (Amazon
later announced it would extend the moratorium); Jeffrey Dastin, Amazon Extends
Moratorium on Police Use of Facial Recognition Software, REUTERS (May 18, 2021, 1:12 PM),
https://www.reuters.com/technology/exclusive-amazon-extends-moratorium-police-usefacial-recognition-software-2021-05-18/.
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Microsoft likewise announced a moratorium on sales.155 In
jurisdictions around the nation, pressure from social and racial
justice activists is paying off as governments ban public use of FRT.156
At the same time, however, these victories are limited. After all,
Detroit ultimately renewed its DataWorks contract.157 While some
American firms have backed away from providing FRT to
government agencies, they are smaller players in the market.158
Federal legislation to regulate the use of FRT has been introduced
but not yet enacted.159 And while government use of FRT is an
increasingly visible and salient policy issue, private usage remains
almost entirely unfettered.160 In short, large American firms have
been vulnerable to pressure from workers and from movement
activists, but that pressure does not inevitably translate into
progressive outcomes.

155. Charlotte Jee, IBM Says It Is No Longer Working on Face Recognition Because It’s Used
for Racial Profiling, MIT TECH. REV. (June 9, 2020), https://www.technologyreview.com/
2020/06/09/1002947/ibm-says-it-is-no-longer-working-on-face-recognition-because-itsused-for-racial-profiling/; Jay Greene, Microsoft Won’t Sell Police Its Facial-Recognition
Technology, Following Similar Moves By Amazon and IBM, W ASH. P OST (June 11, 2020),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2020/06/11/microsoftfacial-recognition/.
156. Ally Jarmanning, Boston Bans Use of Facial Recognition Technology. It’s The 2ndLargest City To Do So, WBUR (June 24, 2020), https://www.wbur.org/news/
2020/06/23/boston-facial-recognition-ban; Dave Gershgorn, Maine Passes the Strongest State
Facial
Recognition
Ban
Yet,
THE
VERGE
(June
30,
2021,
1:49
PM),
https://www.theverge.com/2021/6/30/22557516/maine-facial-recognition-ban-state-law;
Facial Recognition Technology Ban Passed by King County Council, KING COUNTY (June 1, 2021),
https://kingcounty.gov/council/mainnews/2021/June/6-01-facial-recognition.aspx.
157. Christine Ferretti & Sarah Rahal, Detroit Council Oks Controversial Contract for
Facial Recognition Software, DETROIT NEWS (Sept. 29, 2020, 8:04 AM),
https://www.detroitnews.com/story/news/local/detroit-city/2020/09/29/detroitcouncil-vote-facial-recognition/3563440001/.
158. Will Knight, IBM’s Withdrawal Won’t Mean the End of Facial Recognition, WIRED
(June 10, 2020, 7:00 AM), https://www.wired.com/story/ibm-withdrawal-wont-mean-endfacial-recognition/.
159. Tate Ryan-Mosley, We Could See Federal Regulation on Face Recognition as Early as
Next Week, MIT TECH. REV. (May 21, 2021), https://www.technologyreview.com/
2021/05/21/1025155/amazon-face-recognition-federal-ban-police-reform/.
160. Ng, supra note 148 (describing widespread private adoption of Ring cameras);
Metz, supra note 132 (describing private use of facial recognition).
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C. Immigration
Immigration enforcement has also become increasingly entwined
with tech.161 Particularly at the border, high-tech surveillance has
become standard.162 Like critics of facial recognition technology,
activists concerned about the use of technology in immigration
contexts have drawn on the potential for automated decisionmaking to aggravate bias, inaccuracy, and expansive discretion.
Consider, for example, the reaction to President Trump’s
“Muslim Ban” executive order, which called for aggressive screening
of immigrants and visa applicants.163 Soon after the order, ICE
issued a Statement of Objectives for a contractor to “develop and
implement a continuous vetting strategy” to automate substantial
portions of what it called the “Extreme Vetting Initiative.”164
Representatives from a host of technology firms and defense
contractors, including IBM and software company SAS, attended
“Industry Days” about the project.165
Civil society organizations and technologists opposed “extreme
vetting” on accuracy and objectivity grounds, arguing that it would
161. Anil Kalhan, Immigration Surveillance, 74 MD. L. REV. 1, (2014) (observing that
immigration surveillance is transforming immigration control “into part of a more expansive
regime of migration and mobility surveillance, operating without geographic bounds upon
citizens and noncitizens alike”); Todd Miller & Nick Buxton, Biden’s Border: The Industry, the
Democrats and the 2020 Elections, TRANSNATIONAL INSTITUTE 1, 12 (Feb. 2021),
https://www.tni.org/files/publication-downloads/bidens-border-briefing-tni-feb14.pdf
(describing and documenting political contributions by key contractors providing detention,
data processing, and surveillance services at the border). For a historical perspective on the
emergence of the immigration surveillance apparatus, see Iván Chaar-López, Sensing
Intruders: Race and the Automation of Border Control, 71 AM. Q. 495 (2019).
162. Emma Knight & Alex Gekker, Mapping Interfacial Regimes of Control: Palantir’s ICM
in America’s Post-9/11 Security Technology Infrastructures, 18 SURVEILLANCE & SOCIETY 231
(2020); Shannon Mattern, All Eyes on the Border, PLACES (2018), https://placesjournal.org/
article/all-eyes-on-the-border/?cn-reloaded=1; Ron Nixon, On the Mexican Border, a Case for
Technology Over Concrete, N.Y. TIMES (June 20, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/
06/20/us/politics/on-the-mexican-border-a-case-for-technology-over-concrete.html.
163. Exec. Order No. 13780, 82 Fed. Reg. 13209 Sec. 5 (Mar. 9, 2017).
164. ICE Statement of Objectives, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST. (June 12, 2017),
http://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/Extreme%20Vetting%20Inititate%20%20Statement%20of%20Objectives.pdf.
165. ICE Industry Days Sign-In Sheets, B RENNAN C TR. FOR JUST. (July 18–19, 2017),
https://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/Industry%20Day%20Sign-in%
20sheets%20-%20July%2018%2C%202017_0.pdf and https://www.brennancenter.org/sites/
default/files/Industry%20Day%20Sign-in%20sheets%20-%20July%2019%2C%202017.pdf.
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enable ICE to exercise “maximal latitude to discriminate beneath
the cover of an unproven algorithm.”166 Nevertheless, ICE moved
forward with plans to spend $100 million on an automated
screening mechanism.167 Months later, ICE dropped its goal of
automating screening after it became clear that artificial intelligence
and machine learning were not going to be able to fulfill its
automation imperative, instead turning to human labor to
accomplish the same goals.168
The expansion and increasing severity of immigration
enforcement have also fueled the Abolish ICE! movement.169 As
Marisol Orihuela details, Abolish ICE! advocates for the
abandonment of the current model of immigration enforcement,
including deportations and detention.170 Infamous policies of
“zero tolerance,” courthouse arrests, and family separation led to
numerous demonstrations and acts of civil disobedience in

166. See Coalition Letter to DHS Opposing the Extreme Vetting Initiative, BRENNAN
CTR. FOR JUST. (Nov. 16, 2017), https://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/
files/Coalition%20Letter%20to%20DHS%20Opposing%20the%20Extreme%20Vetting%20I
nitiative%20-%2011.15.17.pdf; Technology Experts Letter to DHS Opposing the Extreme Vetting
Initiative, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST. (Nov. 16, 2017), https://www.brennancenter.org/sites/
default/files/Technology%20Experts%20Letter%20to%20DHS%20Opposing%20the%20Ext
reme%20Vetting%20Initiative%20-%2011.15.17.pdf (“There is a wealth of literature
demonstrating that even the ‘best’ automated decision-making models generate an
unacceptable number of errors when predicting rare events.”).
167. Faiza Patel & Harsha Panduranga, DHS’ Constant Vetting Initiative: A Muslim-Ban
by Algorithm, JUST SECURITY (Mar. 12 2018), https://www.justsecurity.org/53671/dhsconstant-vetting-initiative-muslim-ban-algorithm/.
168. Drew Harwell & Nick Miroff, ICE Just Abandoned Its Dream of “Extreme Vetting”
Software That Could Predict Whether a Foreign Visitor Would Become a Terrorist, WASH. POST
(May 17, 2018, 1:33 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-switch/wp/
2018/05/17/ice-just-abandoned-its-dream-of-extreme-vetting-software-that-could-predictwhether-a-foreign-visitor-would-become-a-terrorist/.
169. Rachel Levinson-Waldman & Haley Hinkle, The Abolish ICE Movement Explained,
BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST. (July 30, 2018), https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/
analysis-opinion/abolish-ice-movement-explained; Sean McElwee, It’s Time to Abolish ICE, THE
NATION (Mar. 9, 2018), https://www.thenation.com/article/archive/its-time-to-abolish-ice/.
170. Marisol Orihuela, Crim-Imm Lawyering, 34 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 613, 638 (2020); see also
Allegra M. McLeod, Envisioning Abolition Democracy, 132 HARV. L. REV. 1613, 1623 (2019);
Akbar, supra note 28, at 461 (describing the call in the Vision for Black Lives for an end to
“immigration detention and deportation and ICE raids”); see also Peter L. Markowitz, Abolish
ICE – and Then What, 129 YALE L.J. F. 130 (2019).
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resistance to the immigration enforcement apparatus and to ICE
more specifically.171
Detentions and deportations depend on an informational
infrastructure made possible by partnerships with technology
firms.172 Mijente, a Latinx rights organization active in the
movement to abolish ICE, has targeted tech firms such as Amazon,
Palantir, and Anduril, using Freedom of Information Act requests
to gather information on the contracts these companies have
entered into with ICE.173 Under the motto “NoTechForICE,”
Mijente has also organized students to oppose Palantir’s ability to
recruit on campuses around the globe.174 Drawing on critiques of
the purported “fairness” and “objectivity” of predictive policing,
Mijente has described Palantir’s software as reflecting a “racist
feedback loop.”175
President Trump’s anti-immigration policies fostered an
unprecedented degree of solidarity between labor activism in the
171. Jacqueline Thomsen, #Womendisobey March Shuts Down DC Streets to Protest
Trump Immigration Policies, THE HILL (June 12, 2018, 2:26 PM), https://thehill.com/blogs/blogbriefing-room/news/394667-womendisobey-march-shuts-down-dc-streets-to-protest-trump;
Shira Feder, 1,000 Protesters with Jewish Group Block Entrance to ICE Headquarters for Hours, THE
DAILY BEAST: POLITICS (July 16, 2019, 5:22 PM), https://www.thedailybeast.com/never-againaction-1000-protesters-with-jewish-group-block-entrance-to-ice-headquarters; Monsy Alvarado,
36 Protesters Arrested at Elizabeth ICE Detention Center, Charged with Blocking Street, NORTH JERSEY
(July 1, 2019, 12:00 PM), https://www.northjersey.com/story/news/new-jersey/2019/
07/01/ice-detention-center-nj-protesters-arrested-obstruction-charges/1617018001/; Sarah RuizGrossman, “Occupy ICE” Movement Spreads Across Cities Nationwide, HUFFINGTON POST
(July 5, 2018, 6:43 PM), https://www.huffpost.com/entry/occupy-ice-protests-san-francisconationwide-trump-immigration_n_5b3e89b8e4b09e4a8b2b451a.
172. See Orihuela, supra note 170, at 638 (“Mijente is also firmly opposed to
privatization of immigration enforcement.”).
173. Who’s Behind ICE? The Tech and Data Companies Fueling Deportations,
NAT’L IMMIGR. PROJECT (Oct. 24, 2018), https://www.nationalimmigrationproject.org/
PDFs/community/2018_23Oct_whos-behind-ice.pdf; Anduril’s New Border Surveillance
Contract with the US Marine Corps & CBP, MIJENTE (July 24, 2019),
https://mijente.net/2019/07/anduril/; Jennifer Lee et al., Power and Technology: Who Gets
to Make the Decisions?, 28 INTERACTIONS 38, 40 (2020); see also Sarah Lamdan, When Westlaw
Fuels ICE Surveillance: Legal Ethics in the Era of Big Data Policing, 43 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC.
CHANGE 255 (2019) (documenting the role of Westlaw in ICE surveillance).
174. Students Vs ICE, NO TECH FOR ICE, https://notechforice.com/studentpower/ (last
visited Sept. 25, 2022).
175. Who’s Behind ICE? The Tech and Data Companies Fueling Deportations, supra note 173,
at 53; see supra Section I.A (describing the concerns about fairness that arise when algorithms
are trained on data that reflect racist law enforcement practices).
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tech industry and movements that support dismantling the
architecture of immigration enforcement. In January 2017, tech
workers picketed outside Palantir’s headquarters after The Verge
published a story about the firm’s role in facilitating the Trump
Administration’s “extreme vetting” program.176 The following
year, demonstrators from Tech Workers Coalition, Silicon Valley
Rising, and a variety of labor groups again protested outside the
Palantir headquarters.177
Workers at other firms have also protested the provision of
services to ICE. In 2018, employees at Amazon wrote a letter
demanding that the firm cease providing Amazon Web Services to
Palantir.178 Workers at GitHub, and its parent company, Microsoft,
have also organized in protest of the firm’s contracts with ICE.179 In
2016, ICE licensed GitHub’s Enterprise Server, software for
developing code.180 The agreement was not public until 2019 when
GitHub CEO Nat Friedman wrote an internal letter justifying the
decision to renew the license.181 Shortly thereafter, tech workers
protested outside Friedman’s keynote at an annual GitHub
conference, and several employees publicly resigned.182 At
Microsoft, over 100 employees signed onto a 2018 internal letter

176. Sarah Buhr, Tech Employees Protest in Front of Palantir HQ Over Fears It Will Build Trump’s
Muslim Registry, TECHCRUNCH (Jan. 18, 2017, 1:43 PM), https://social.techcrunch.com/
2017/01/18/tech-employees-protest-in-front-of-palantir-hq-over-fears-it-will-build-trumpsmuslim-registry/.
177. Sue Dremann, Protesters Demand Palantir End ICE Contract, PALO ALTO WEEKLY
(July 31, 2018, 7:28 PM), https://www.paloaltoonline.com/news/2018/07/31/protestersdemand-palantir-end-ice-contracts.
178. Ali Breland, Dear Jeff, SCRIBD, https://www.scribd.com/document/
382334740/Dear-Jeff (last visited Nov. 2, 2022). The letter also protested the provision of
facial recognition services to law enforcement agencies. See supra Section II.B.
179. Shirin Ghaffary, GitHub is the Latest Tech Company to Face Controversy Over Its
Contracts with ICE, VOX (Oct. 9, 2019, 3:21 PM), https://www.vox.com/recode/
2019/10/9/20906605/github-ice-contract-immigration-ice-dan-friedman.
180. Nat Friedman, GitHub and US Government Developers, GITHUB (Oct. 9, 2019),
https://github.blog/2019-10-09-github-and-us-government-developers/.
181. Id.
182. Janus Rose & Lauren Gurley, As GitHub’s Conference Begins, Five Employees Resign
Over ICE Contract, VICE (Nov. 13, 2019, 9:59 AM), https://www.vice.com/en/article/
evjwwp/as-githubs-conference-begins-five-employees-resign-over-protest-ice-contract.
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protesting the firm’s contract to provide cloud services to ICE.183
Similar protests took place at Salesforce, which entered into a
contract with Customs and Border Patrol to provide cloud services
for the agency in 2018.184
Increasingly, Mijente has organized alongside tech workers, not
just in parallel. In July 2019, tech workers, immigrants, and social
justice movement groups demonstrated together at the Amazon
Web Services summit in New York City in protest of the firm’s
business relationships with ICE.185 In a 2020 open letter, Microsoft
employees explicitly supported Mijente’s campaign to get ICE to
stop rounding up immigrants during the coronavirus crisis.186
From one perspective, this advocacy has failed to achieve the
intended results. As Mary Fan describes it, these firms
determined—notwithstanding worker advocacy—to “keep the
contracts” and continue their work with immigration enforcement
agencies.187 Recent evidence also shows that technology firms are
growing their relationships with CBP/ICE. In November 2020, ICE
announced a pre-solicitation for a $100 million contract to provide
cloud services using Amazon Web Services and Microsoft Azure.188
Palantir’s footprint in the U.S. government has only grown: the
company’s disclosures in connection with its initial public offering

183. Sheera Frenkel, Microsoft Employees Protest Work with ICE, as Tech Industry Mobilizes Over
Immigration,
N.Y. TIMES
(June
19,
2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/
19/technology/tech-companies-immigration-border.html. See generally Tom Keane, Federal
Agencies Continue to Advance Capabilities with Azure Government, MICROSOFT (Jan. 24, 2018),
https://devblogs.microsoft.com/azuregov/federal-agencies-continue-to-advance-capabilitieswith-azure-government/.
184. Fan, supra note 95, at 1015–16.
185. Hannah Denham, “No Tech for ICE”: Protesters Demand Amazon Cut Ties
with Federal Immigration Enforcement, WASH. POST (July 12, 2019, 3:45 PM),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/2019/07/12/no-tech-ice-protestersdemand-amazon-cut-ties-with-federal-immigration-enforcement/.
186. Benjamin Pimentel, Immigrant Rights Group and Microsoft Workers Blast ICE Raids Amid
Coronavirus Crisis: ‘The Way ICE is Operating is Reckless’, BUS. INSIDER (Mar. 19, 2020, 5:29 PM),
https://www.businessinsider.com/ice-mijente-microsoft-coronavirus-crisis-2020-3.
187. Fan, supra note 95 at 1017.
188. Dave Nyczepir, ICE’s $100M Cloud Deal Could Renew Pressure on AWS, Microsoft
Over Human Rights Abuses, FEDSCOOP (Nov. 25, 2020), https://www.fedscoop.com/icecloud-deal-amazon-microsoft/.
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in 2020 showed that its government work accounted for most of its
revenue and that its share was increasing.189
Yet the emerging collaboration between tech workers and
movement organizations such as Mijente has also fueled change.
Mijente’s frontal attack on the role of privatization in bolstering
immigration enforcement generally, and the specific roles of
contractors such as Amazon, Palantir, Anduril, and others in
facilitating deportations, has shaped worker advocacy within these
firms and throughout the industry. As tech worker Matt Schaefer
put it, “Trump can’t build a Muslim registry without tech.
He can’t build surveillance tools without some support from tech.
He can’t target an entire population of undocumented immigrants
without tech.”190 In January 2021, Google workers formed the
Alphabet Workers Union with the stated goal to “examine Google’s
role in society and help reshape the company’s culture.”191 In
February, workers at blogging platform Medium also formed a
union.192 Like Google workers, Medium workers emphasized the
desire to consider the social context and role of the firm “in a
landscape of tech and media that has historically deprioritized user
safety and combating misinformation.”193 Though tangible changes
to business practices remain elusive, the emergence of socially
conscious tech-worker unions signals greater demands for worker
participation and voice in business decisions with ramifications
for society.194

189. Marisa Franco, Palantir Filed to Go Public. The Firm’s Unethical Technology Should
Horrify Us, GUARDIAN (Sept. 4, 2020, 6:23 AM), http://www.theguardian.com/
commentisfree/2020/sep/04/palantir-ipo-ice-immigration-trump-administration.
190. Gretchen Röehrs, “A World to Win,” with Matt Schaefer and Kristen Sheets from the
Tech Workers Coalition, LOGIC (June 9, 2017), https://logicmag.io/tech-against-trump/mattschaefer-and-kristen-sheets-tech-workers-coalition/; see also Estefania McCarroll, Weapons of
Mass Deportation: Big Data and Automated Decision-making Systems in Immigration Law, 34 GEO.
IMMIGR. L.J. 705 (2020).
191. Bobby Allyn, Google Workers Speak Out About Why They Formed a Union: ‘To Protect
Ourselves’, NPR (Jan. 8, 2021, 5:06 AM), https://www.npr.org/2021/01/08/954710407/atgoogle-hundreds-of-workers-formed-a-labor-union-why-to-protect-ourselves.
192. Zoe Schiffer, Workers at Medium Are Unionizing, THE VERGE (Feb. 11,
2021, 3:58 PM), https://www.theverge.com/2021/2/11/22278684/medium-union-unionizingcommunications-workers-america.
193. Our
Vision
for
Medium,
MEDIUM
WORKERS
UNION
(MWU),
https://mediumworkersunion.org/(last visited Sept. 25, 2022).
194. See infra Section III.B.
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Social and labor movements are increasingly converging
around issues related to the state’s use of technologies in highstakes settings. Mobilization both within and outside tech firms has
shaped companies’ decisions to develop or abandon some products
(like facial recognition) and some partnerships (like Project Maven).
But while social and labor movements’ influence appears to have
grown, the approach to company-by-company activism is
necessarily limited. When one firm steps away due to social and
labor pressure, another is almost always there to fill the gap.
III. ALGORITHMIC ACCOUNTABILITY FROM TOP TO BOTTOM
One might imagine that the kinds of social and labor
mobilization described in the preceding Part could significantly
impact the nascent law that will constrain, shape, and limit
algorithmic governance.195 Indeed, the democratic vision can also
be understood as a powerful form of advocacy for direct
“algorithmic accountability,” in the sense that people are calling
both the state and the firms that enable its policies to account for
their decisions.196 But the legal status quo does not reflect these
demands, and bottom-up reforms may also disappoint.
A. Top-Down Approaches
Existing legal and policy approaches offer only a tepid response
to the democratic vision for algorithmic governance. Today, the
dominant law and policy of algorithmic accountability,

195. See, e.g., Lani Guinier & Gerald Torres, Changing the Wind: Notes Toward a
Demosprudence of Law and Social Movements, 123 YALE L.J. 2740, 2750 (2014) (“[O]ngoing
collective action by ordinary people can permanently alter the practice of democracy
by changing the people who make the law and the landscape in which that law is made.”);
Tomiko Brown-Nagin, Elites, Social Movements, and the Law: The Case of Affirmative Action, 105
COLUM. L. REV. 1436, 1488–89 (2005) (describing how constitutional scholarship had
“traditionally overlooked the ability of ordinary people to influence the path of the law”);
Akbar, supra note 28, at 474 (summarizing legal scholarship on social movements and
explaining how it “tends to focus on how social movement claims are translated or
saturated by law”).
196. Edward Rubin, The Myth of Accountability and the Anti-Administrative Impulse, 103
MICH. L. REV. 2073, 2119 (2005) (defining accountability as “the ability of one actor to demand
an explanation or justification of another actor . . . and to reward or punish that second actor
on the basis of its performance or its explanation”).
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transparency, bias, and accuracy reaffirm powerful actors’ control
over algorithmic design, use, and policy.197
1. Ethics and Principles
Growing attention to “AI ethics” points toward one potential
path forward for algorithmic accountability and transparency.198
But private firms’ commitments to “ethical AI” are often vague and
devoid of practical application.199 Despite broad promises of
fidelity to principles of accountability and transparency, many
private sector “AI ethics” guidelines include scant detail about
how they will be operationalized.200 Although to some extent
consensus around ethical principles of transparency and
accountability has begun to solidify, researchers have also found that
private organizations are less inclusive and less participatory in the
design and creation of their ethical principles than public and non-

197. Mulligan & Bamberger, supra note 17; Solow-Niederman, supra note 17.
198. See Jessica Fjeld, Nele Achten, Hannah Hilligoss, Adam Nagy & Madhulika
Srikumar, Principled Artificial Intelligence: Mapping Consensus in Ethical and Rights-based
Approaches to Principles for AI, BERKMAN KLEIN CTR. FOR INTERNET & SOC’Y (2020),
http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:42160420; Mittelstadt et al., supra note 27;
Mike Ananny, Toward an Ethics of Algorithms: Convening, Observation, Probability, and
Timeliness, 41 SCIENCE, TECHN., & HUM. VALUES 93 (2016); Abeba Birhane & Fred Cummins,
Algorithmic Injustices: Towards a Relational Ethics (2019), http://arxiv.org/abs/1912.07376;
Chelsea Barabas, Karthik Dinaker, Joichi Ito, Madars Virza & Jonathan Zittrain, Interventions
over Predictions: Reframing the Ethical Debate for Actuarial Risk Assessment, (2017),
http://arxiv.org/abs/1712.08238; Luciano Floridi, Josh Cowls, Monica Beltrametti,
Raja Chatila, Patrice Chazerand, Virginia Dignum, Christoph Luetge, Robert Madelin,
Ugo Pagallo, Francesca Rossi, Burkhard Schafer, Peggy Valcke & Effy Vayena, AI4People—
An Ethical Framework for a Good AI Society: Opportunities, Risks, Principles, and
Recommendations, 28 MINDS & MACHINES 689 (2018); Daniel Greene, Anna Hoffmann & Luke
Stark, Better, Nicer, Clearer, Fairer: A Critical Assessment of the Movement for Ethical Artificial
Intelligence and Machine Learning, PROC. OF THE 52ND HAW. INT’L CONF. ON SYS. SCI’S (2019).
199. Brent Mittelstadt, Principles Alone Cannot Guarantee Ethical AI, NATURE MACH.
INTEL. (Nov. 5, 2019), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3391293 (“The
absence of a fiduciary relationship in AI means that users cannot trust that developers will
act in their best interests when implementing ethical principles in practice.”).
200. Artificial Intelligence at Google: Our Principles, GOOGLE AI, https://ai.google/
principles/ (last visited Nov. 2, 2022) (promising that AI will be “accountable to people”);
IBM’s Principles for Trust and Transparency, IBM (June 2018), https://www.ibm.com/policy/
wp-content/uploads/2018/06/IBM_Principles_SHORT.V4.3.pdf (“IBM will make clear:
when and for what purposes AI is being applied . . . .”).
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governmental organizations.201 As vendors assert their own
interests in accountability and transparency, they simultaneously
reframe those values as technical ones that can only be achieved
from the top down.202
Emerging efforts to translate AI ethics into public policy do
not fundamentally question the power of the private sector to
define key terms and values. At the federal level, a light-touch
approach to AI has meant the proliferation of ethics rules,
principles, and guidelines with uncertain impact. Executive Order
13859 stressed the potential of artificial intelligence technologies to
contribute to “scientific discovery, economic competitiveness, and
national security.”203 While the Order also acknowledged, in
general terms, the need to “protect civil liberties, privacy, and
American values,” it offered no clear guidance on how to do so.204
Instead, it tasked the Office of Management and Budget with
developing a memorandum to “inform the development of
regulatory and non-regulatory approaches” to AI and instructed
the National Institute of Standards and Technology to develop a
plan for U.S. federal government involvement in the “development
of technical standards” for AI.205
Nor do “ethical AI” principles developed in the public sector
offer much clarity. Some national security and defense agencies
have already adopted their own principles for AI. For instance, the
Principles of Artificial Intelligence Ethics for the Intelligence
Community stresses that the Intelligence Community ought to
“provide appropriate transparency” and “identify and mitigate
bias” with respect to its use of AI.206 Outside of the national security
context, Executive Order 13960 sets principles for the use of AI
201. D. Schiff, Jason Borenstein, Justin Biddle & Kelly Laas, AI Ethics in the Public,
Private, and NGO Sectors: A Review of a Global Document Collection, 2 IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON
TECH. AND SOC’Y 31, 41 (Mar. 2021).
202. Hannah Bloch-Wehba, Transparency’s AI Problem, supra note 54, at 10 (“The private
sector not only occupies a central role in making ‘transparency’ technically achievable, but
also in interpreting its core meaning.”).
203. Exec. Order No. 13859, 84 Fed. Reg. 3967, § 1(a) (Feb. 14, 2019).
204. Id. at § 1(d).
205. Id. at § 6(a), (d).
206. Principles of Artificial Intelligence Ethics for the Intelligence Community, INTEL.GOV,
https://www.intelligence.gov/principles-of-artificial-intelligence-ethics-for-the-intelligencecommunity (last visited Nov. 2, 2022).
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by federal government agencies, requiring agencies to use AI
in a way that is “lawful,” “accurate, reliable, and effective,”
and “transparent.”207
Articulating standards for “AI ethics” helps to establish
minimal norms. But without further definition and elaboration of
these values, these requirements cannot provide meaningful legal
constraint. As a result, efforts to promote “ethical AI” largely do
not reflect democratic demands for accountability, transparency,
and democratic control.
2. Task Forces
Some governments have addressed critiques of algorithmic
decision-making through a “task force” model designed to
shed light on potential areas of concern and inform future
policy recommendations.208 Task forces tend to perform the role of
studying or investigating the implications of AI but usually have
no power to make policy.209 The result is a form of AI policymaking
that appears to take seriously AI’s harms while maintaining a
permissive, laissez-faire regulatory environment.210
Even when governments have explicitly required task forces to
address the use of AI in government, significant obstacles have at
times prevented meaningful public participation. Take, for
instance, New York City’s experience with its Automated Decision
System Task Force (ADS). The ADS task force was created in 2017
to “develop recommendations that will provide a framework” for
the city’s use of ADS, but opportunities for public input and

207. Exec. Order No. 13960, 85 Fed. Reg. 13960, § 3(c) (Dec. 8, 2020).
208. Cf. Dorf & Sabel, supra note 48, at 318 (describing how “municipal task forces”
could provide opportunities for “effective participation”).
209. See, e.g., STATE OF VT. AGENCY OF COM. & CMTY. DEV., ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE
TASK FORCE, FINAL REPORT, at 16 (Jan. 15, 2020) (endorsing the creation of a permanent A.I.
commission to “study and monitor artificial intelligence development and use, and report to
the Legislature and the Executive branches”). State Artificial Intelligence Policy, ELEC. PRIV.
INFO. CENTER, https://epic.org/state-policy/ai/ (last visited Nov. 2, 2022) (Alabama and
New York have created AI commissions to study legal and policy aspects of artificial
intelligence, presumably including accountability and transparency issues.).
210. Rebecca Crootof & B.J. Ard, Structuring Techlaw, 34 HARV. J. L. & TECH. 347, 379
(2021) (distinguishing between permissive and precautionary approaches).
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engagement were exceedingly limited.211 After city agencies failed
to turn over required records,212 what had been hailed as a
groundbreaking achievement in public governance of AI was
ultimately deemed a “spectacular failure.”213
Even when it works well, though, the task force model has
significant limitations as a mechanism for fostering immediate
change. While task forces can bolster the political salience and
visibility of algorithmic governance in public discourse, their limited
powers generally make them unable to effectuate legal reforms.
3. Disclosure and Trade Secrecy Reforms
Other government entities have focused on limiting or
eliminating what is perhaps the most obvious barrier to
transparency: the routine invocation of trade secrecy to shield key
information from view by affected individuals or the public. As
both Amy Kapczynski and Julie Cohen have recognized, trade
secrecy claims can obstruct democratic control and regulation.214
Trade secrecy claims present novel entanglements between the
interests of private vendors and those of the government.
Increasingly, public agencies are being placed in the position of
advancing or protecting private vendors’ trade secrecy interests to
the detriment of the public. When advocates sought access to
information about Palantir, for example, the New York Police
Department resisted the request, arguing that Palantir’s trade
secrecy interests precluded it from releasing information under

211. NEW YORK CITY AUTOMATED DECISION SYSTEMS TASK FORCE REPORT 3, 15 (2019),
https://www1.nyc.gov/assets/adstaskforce/downloads/pdf/ADS-Report-11192019.pdf
(describing how the Task Force had two public forums and six smaller “community
sessions” at which members of the public were permitted to testify).
212. Rashida Richardson, Confronting Black Boxes: A Shadow Report of the New York City
Algorithmic Decision System Task Force, A.I. NOW INST. (Dec. 4, 2019),
https://static1.squarespace.com/static/5f2c8da15040df578f6b6b34/t/5f9b85707b34c73724
dc2b6a/1604027762243/ads-shadowreport-2019.pdf.
213. Albert Fox Cahn, The First Effort to Regulate AI Was a Spectacular Failure, FAST CO.
(Nov. 26, 2019), https://www.fastcompany.com/90436012/the-first-effort-to-regulate-aiwas-a-spectacular-failure.
214. Amy Kapczynski, The Law of Informational Capitalism, 129 Y ALE L.J. 1460,
1509–10; C OHEN, supra note 54, at 191 (describing how trade secrecy claims can
undermine regulatory accountability).
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New York’s Freedom of Information Law.215 New Jersey
prosecutors have likewise argued that trade secrecy interests
belonging to a vendor of probabilistic DNA software precluded the
prosecution from disclosing source code to the defense.216
Legislation has been proposed or enacted to address these
problems in several jurisdictions. For example, the Justice in
Forensic Algorithms Act would amend the Federal Rules of
Evidence to prevent institutions from invoking trade secrecy to
prevent disclosure of evidence to criminal defendants.217 A similar
statute enacted in 2019 in Idaho requires pretrial risk assessment
algorithms to be “transparent” and specifies that “[n]o builder or
user of a pretrial risk assessment algorithm may assert trade secret
or other protections in order to quash discovery in a criminal matter
by a party to a criminal case.”218
At the same time, however, these interventions fall short of fully
addressing the problem of algorithmic opacity. To be sure,
evidentiary tweaks to trade secrecy rules will help address
profound inequities in criminal discovery.219 But because they only
address criminal discovery, rather than broader pathologies of
secrecy and opacity within law enforcement more generally, these
fixes suggest that even if trade secrecy is addressed within the
discovery process, vendors that supply law enforcement agencies
can continue to impede public inquiry.220
In order to understand how algorithmic governance works,
trade secrecy reforms are crucial. Current law enables the
government to partner with private vendors who can conceal the
inner functions of their products.221 But current proposals to
215. Brennan Ctr. for Just. at N.Y.U. Sch. of L. v. N.Y.C. Police Dep’t, 2017 N.Y. Misc.
LEXIS 5138, at *9 (Sup. Ct.).
216. State v. Pickett, 246 A.3d 279, 301 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2021) (rejecting New
Jersey’s argument that a private vendor’s trade secrecy interests in a probabilistic DNA
genotyping software compelled nondisclosure to a defendant).
217. H.R. 4368, 116th Cong. (2019).
218. H.B. 118, 65th Leg., 1st Sess. (Idaho 2019).
219. See generally Wexler, supra note 30.
220. See, e.g., Hannah Bloch-Wehba, Visible Policing: Technology, Transparency, and
Democratic Control, 109 CALIF. L. REV. 917, 955–56 (2021) (describing NYPD’s argument that
it could not disclose information about audits or test results pertaining to Palantir’s
predictive policing software because to do so would endanger Palantir’s trade secrets).
221. Id. (explaining that law enforcement interests in secrecy often coincide and overlap
with trade secrecy claims).
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address trade secrecy do not go far enough to ensure that the
public has the information it needs to understand how algorithmic
governance works and is operationalized in practice.
4. Algorithmic Auditing
Scholars and policymakers have also called for algorithmic
audits and impact assessments to detect discrimination and bias in
both private- and public-sector applications.222 Borrowing from the
use of “testers” and audit studies in the context of civil rights, an
“algorithmic audit” can involve examination of a decision process,
its inputs, and its outputs to understand whether automated
decision systems have discriminatory effects.223 While technology
scholars have, broadly speaking, considered how algorithmic
audits might be designed and implemented, legal scholars have
considered how the law might incentivize or require firms to
undergo internal and/or external auditing.224
Emerging proposals hint at paths toward algorithmic auditing
requirements: in the context of online platforms, the European
Commission’s Digital Services Act (DSA) requires that very large
online platforms shall bear the cost of annual independent
audits conducted by auditors with the “technical competence to
audit algorithms.”225 The DSA likewise anticipates that regulators
may require online platforms to provide access to data and

222. Christian Sandvig, Kevin Hamilton, Karrie Karahalios & Cedric Langbort,
Auditing Algorithms: Research Methods for Detecting Discrimination on Internet Platforms,
8 (unpublished manuscript) (paper presented at the 64th Annual Meeting of the International
Communication Association on May 22, 2014); Pauline T. Kim, Auditing Algorithms for
Discrimination, 166 U. PA. L. REV. ONLINE 189 (2017); Dillon Reisman, Jason Schultz, Kate
Crawford & Meredith Whittaker, Algorithmic Impact Assessments: A Practical Framework for
Public Agency Accountability, A.I. NOW INST. (Apr. 2018); Selbst, supra note 89, at 168.
223. Kim, supra note 222, at 190 (relating algorithmic audits to “testing for discrimination”).
224. Ajunwa, An Auditing Imperative, supra note 72, at 674 (describing the competing
visions of internal and external auditing); COHEN, supra note 54, at 179 (“In an era when
decision-making is mediated comprehensively by so-called big data, regulators seeking to
fulfill antidiscrimination mandates must learn to contend with the methods by which
regulated decisions are reached—with data and algorithms as instrumentalities for
conducting (regulated) activity.”).
225. Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on a Single
Market for Digital Services (Digital Services Act) and Amending Directive 2000/31/EC, at ¶ 60,
COM (2020) 825 final (Dec. 15, 2020).
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algorithms so that the Commission has the ability to enforce the
substantive provisions of the legislation.226 In New York City,
proposed legislation would require automated employment
decision tools to be the “subject of a bias audit”—an “impartial
evaluation” of the tool’s compliance with city laws governing
employment discrimination.227
To date, however, no U.S. jurisdiction mandates algorithmic
auditing. Without clear auditing standards, an “audit” can give
firms positive publicity while allowing them to avoid meaningful
oversight.228 Ambiguity about the definition of an “algorithm”
might also keep audits from widespread adoption.229 Moreover, as
Inioluwa Deborah Raji and her coauthors have shown, the auditing
process itself might come with real tradeoffs for privacy and may
well lead private actors to become “wary” of scrutiny.230 Most
importantly, algorithmic audits are often designed by and for
experts and bureaucrats, not for use by the public or by those who
are directly affected by algorithms’ disparate impacts.231
Ambiguity about the content, scope, and significance of
algorithmic audits contributes to their ineffectiveness as a mechanism
for public oversight. The qualities that make an audit useful for
internal purposes may be very different from what makes it

226. Id. at ¶ 100.
227. N.Y. City, N.Y. Int. No. 1894 § 20-871(1).
228. Alfred Ng, Can Auditing Eliminate Bias from Algorithms?, THE MARKUP (Feb. 23,
2021), https://themarkup.org/ask-the-markup/2021/02/23/can-auditing-eliminate-biasfrom-algorithms (“Companies might use them to make real improvements, but they might
not. And there are no industry standards or regulations that hold the auditors or the
companies that use them to account.”).
229. Rumman Chowdhury & Kristian Lum, What Is an “Algorithm”? It Depends Whom
You Ask, MIT TECH. REV. (Feb. 26, 2021), https://www.technologyreview.com/
2021/02/26/1020007/what-is-an-algorithm/.
230. Inioluwa Deborah Raji, Joy Buolamwini, Emily Denton, Timnit Gebru, Joonseok
Lee & Margaret Mitchel, Saving Face: Investigating the Ethical Concerns of Facial Recognition
Auditing, at 3.2.3, (Jan. 3, 2020), http://arxiv.org/abs/2001.00964 (describing how IBM
“removed its facial recognition capabilities from its publicly distributed API” after the highly
publicized Buolamwini and Gebru Gender Shades study, supra note 67).
231. Michael Katell, Corinne Binz, Dharma Dailey, Vivian Guetler, Bernease Herman,
P.M. Krafft, Daniella Raz, Aaron Tam & Meg Young, An Algorithmic Equity Toolkit for
Technology Audits by Community Advocates and Activists, (Dec. 6, 2019), http://arxiv.org/abs/
1912.02943 (preprint: under review) (on file with Cornell University).
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effective for the purposes of public oversight.232 At a minimum,
unless audits are public, and conducted through a standardized,
public-oriented process, they are unlikely to be a direct mechanism
for public participation and democratic control.
5. Algorithmic Impact Assessments
Algorithmic impact assessments (AIAs) are likewise intended
to promote fairness and nondiscrimination in algorithms,
particularly in public-sector contexts. For instance, Andrew Selbst
has proposed requiring police to produce “algorithmic impact
statements” designed to ensure that they consider the potentially
discriminatory impacts of predictive policing before using the
technology.233 The AIA model draws on analogies to impact
assessments in other contexts, such as environmental law and
privacy law.234 The AIA also facilitates critical information flow and
public engagement, which are particularly important because the
public often struggles to get access to key information about how
algorithmic governance functions.235
In practice, while regulations requiring algorithmic impact
assessments are becoming more prevalent, they vary widely.236
Three examples illustrate the divergences. In 2019, the Government
of Canada enacted a directive that requires algorithmic impact
assessments “prior to the production of any automated decision

232. Sasha Costanza-Chock, Inioluwa Deborah Raji & Joy Buolamwini, Who Audits the
Auditors? Recommendations from a Field Scan of the Algorithmic Auditing Ecosystem, 2022 ACM
CONF. ON FAIRNESS, ACCOUNTABILITY, AND TRANSPARENCY 1571 (June 20, 2022).
233. Selbst, supra note 89, at 168–69.
234. Id. at 170–71; Reisman et al., supra note 222, at 7.
235. Reisman et al., supra note 222, at 4 (describing the AIA framework as a mechanism
for ensuring the flow of information).
236. Emanuel Moss, Madeleine Clare Elish, Jacob Metcalf, Ranjit Singh & Elizabeth Anne
Watkins, Governing with Algorithmic Impact Assessments: Six Observations, AAAI/ACM CONF. ON A.I.
ETHICS, AND SOC’Y, at 2 (2021), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3846300 (describing the AIA as
“a compelling intervention . . . [that] leaves more questions than answers”); Emanuel Moss,
Madeleine Clare Elish, Jacob Metcalf, Ranjit Singh & Elizabeth Anne Watkins, Assembling
Accountability: Algorithmic Impact Assessment for the Public Interest, DATA & SOC’Y, at 7
(June 29, 2021), https://datasociety.net/library/assembling-accountability-algorithmic-impactassessment-for-the-public-interest/ [hereinafter Assembling Accountability] (observing that
“[n]o existing impact assessment process provides a definition of ‘impact’ that can be
simply operationalized”).
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system[,]” but appears not to require any kind of public notice or
engagement on the assessment itself.237 In contrast, a Washington
law that took effect in 2021 forbids government agencies to
“develop, procure or use” facial recognition technology without
first preparing a detailed “accountability report”—which must be
subject to public review and comment, including at least three
community meetings, before being finalized.238 While initiatives in
Canada and Washington focus on the public sector, the proposed
Algorithmic Accountability Act of 2019 focused instead on
private entities and would have required businesses above a
certain size to conduct “automated decision system impact
assessments” of their own systems, subject to the Federal Trade
Commission’s jurisdiction.239
To a degree, fluidity in AIAs’ design can be a good thing:
impact assessments can and should vary depending on context and
implementation. For example, some impact assessments will
require public consultation, as is the case under Washington’s new
FRT law.240 At other times, as a new Data & Society report points
out, impact assessments might be produced as part of a consent
decree or settlement agreement and held under seal by a court for
“potential future action.”241 But this same flexibility can also
obscure the absence of an underlying consensus about the degree
of public consultation or input that is appropriate in the context of
an AIA. Indeed, like all of the preceding proposals, AIAs have
significant gaps that can undermine their ability to promote
meaningful accountability.

237. GOV’T OF CAN., Directive on Automated Decision-making, (Apr. 1, 2021),
https://www.tbs-sct.gc.ca/pol/doc-eng.aspx?id=32592#appA.
“Automated
Decision
System” is defined as “any technology that either assists or replaces the judgement of human
decision-makers.“ ”Algorithmic Impact Assessment” is defined very broadly to mean “[a]
framework to help institutions better understand and reduce the risks associated with
Automated Decision Systems and to provide the appropriate governance, oversight[,] and
reporting/audit requirements that best match the type of application being designed.” Id. at
Appendix A.
238. S.B. 6280, 66th Reg. Sess. § 3(1) (Engrossed Substitute, Wash. 2020).
239. Algorithmic Accountability Act of 2019, S. 1108, 166th Cong. (2019).
240. S.B. 6280, supra note 238.
241. Assembling Accountability, supra note 234, at 20.
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B. Bottom-Up Solutions
The emerging policy responses outlined above fail to fully
address the kinds of demands for democratic input, participation,
and control that labor and social movements are making. Perhaps,
then, policymakers could draw on a different set of institutional
arrangements for democratic governance inspired by movements
for community control over law enforcement institutions.242
Jurisdictions might consider designing institutions that would
facilitate community control over law enforcement agencies,
including their technology.
So-called “community control over police surveillance” is
moving forward in several jurisdictions around the nation, including
San Francisco, Seattle, Nashville, Pittsburgh, and Cambridge.243
But the degree of control that these initiatives actually secure for
the people remains unclear. Transparency mandates and legislative
control remain the gold standard of many surveillance reformoriented proposals, which emphasize the role of city councils and
other oversight agencies. For instance, in June 2020 New York’s
City Council enacted the Public Oversight of Surveillance
Technologies (POST) Act, which requires the NYPD to make
regular reports to the City Council regarding the surveillance
technologies it uses. A key aspect of the POST Act rests on the
conviction that NYPD’s regular disclosures of information will be
sufficient to bring secretive policing technologies into the open and
invite public debate over them. Nonetheless, the POST Act
provides for no real legislative or public control over NYPD’s
policing technologies other than that generated by potential
outrage over future disclosures.244
242. See generally K. Sabeel Rahman & Jocelyn Simonson, The Institutional Design of
Community Control, 108 CALIF. L. REV. 679 (2020) (examining how community control
mechanisms can be crafted).
243. Community Control Over Police Surveillance, AM. CIV. LIBERTIES UNION,
https://www.aclu.org/issues/privacy-technology/surveillance-technologies/communitycontrol-over-police-surveillance (last visited Sept. 21, 2022).
244. Fuck the Police, Trust the People: Surveillance Bureaucracy Expands the Stalker State,
STOP LAPD SPYING COAL. (June 24, 2020), https://stoplapdspying.org/surveillancebureaucracy-expands-the-stalker-state/ (critiquing the POST Act because it “allows police
to say that the community ‘controls’ surveillance . . . when the truth is that police set the
agenda and hold the power”).
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Other examples of so-called “community control” also
exemplify a technocratic response.245 In a model bill, the ACLU has
suggested that jurisdictions ought to require legislative approval
and police publication of impact assessments and use policies
prior to the acquisition of any new surveillance technology.246
Catherine Crump has also written about how police acquisition of
surveillance technology might be made subject to legislative
oversight.247 Amid broadening calls to defund law enforcement
institutions, democratic power over police budgets surely is a
significant step toward community control.248 But it remains
the norm for legislators, not citizens, to wield direct control of
police budgets.249
What might authentic community control of law enforcement’s
use of technology look like? To begin, it would require undoing the
many ways in which the law protects law enforcement’s preferences
for secrecy. Entrenched opacity about how police acquire and use
surveillance technology makes it difficult to even conceptualize a
form of effective community control.250 At a minimum, these
dynamics make it critical for any community control or civilian
review institution to be empowered to compel the disclosure of key
information about law enforcement technology through subpoena
power or through litigation.251 But transparency alone, of course, is
245. Ferguson, Surveillance and the Tyrant Test, supra note 13, at 250 (At their core, “[t]he goals
of transparency, accountability, and fair process are central to the technocrat’s toolkit.”).
246. CMTY. CONTROL OVER POLICE SURVEILLANCE (CCOPS) MODEL BILL (AM. CIV. LIB.
UNION, Draft Apr. 2021), https://www.aclu.org/other/community-control-over-policesurveillance-ccops-model-bill.
247. Catherine Crump, Surveillance Policy Making by Procurement, 91 WASH. L. REV.
1595, 1659–60 (2016).
248. See supra at Section III.B.1 (discussing participatory budgeting).
249. See, e.g., Matt Sepic, A Year After George Floyd’s Death, Plans for Minneapolis Police
Reform Have Softened, NPR (May 25, 2021, 5:20 PM), https://www.npr.org/2021/
05/25/1000298293/a-year-after-george-floyds-death-plans-for-minneapolis-police-reformhave-soften (describing how, after a majority of the Minneapolis City Council pledged to
defund and disband the police, little has changed).
250. See generally Jonathan Manes, Secrecy & Evasion in Police Surveillance Technology, 34
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 503 (2019).
251. See, e.g., Rahman & Simonson, supra note 242, at 701 n.97 (2020) (describing how
Houston activists have called for the creation of a “civilian review board with subpoena
power”); Clare Dignan, New Haven Approves New Police Civilian Review Board, NEW HAVEN
REG. (Jan. 7, 2019) https://www.nhregister.com/news/article/New-Haven-approves-new-
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not enough. While some cities have embraced efforts to make
surveillance technology more transparent, this is only a first step
toward empowering communities to have a say in police decisions
about new technologies.252
One potential path forward is the use of participatory
budgeting, a “form of local direct democracy” in which people
gather at the local level to deliberate and make decisions about
expending funds and allocating resources.253 Participatory
budgeting was first developed in Porto Alegre, Brazil but has
spread throughout Latin America and Europe.254 The United
States’ largest participatory budgeting program exists in New York,
where it was introduced as the result of advocacy by welfare
recipients and public housing residents.255
Some scholars of democratic politics see participatory
budgeting as a “promising democratic experiment within a larger
tool kit to reimagine the relationship between citizens and their
governance institutions.”256 But participatory budgeting has
significant limitations. While participatory budgeting can give the

police-Civilian-Review-13515897.php (describing New Haven’s creation of a civilian review
board with subpoena and investigatory authority); Udi Ofer, Getting It Right: Building
Effective Civilian Review Boards to Oversee Police, 46 SETON HALL L. REV. 1033, 1035 (2016)
(“[M]any of these regimes were rigged to fail in the first place . . . .”).
252. Dana Afana, Detroit to Boost Surveillance Transparency but Skeptics Remain, DETROIT
FREE PRESS (May 29, 2021), https://www.freep.com/story/news/2021/05/29/detroitersfeedback-facial-recognition-surveillance/7486598002/; Kyle Wiggers, NYC Passes POST Act,
Requiring Police Department to Reveal Surveillance Technologies, VENTUREBEAT (June 18, 2020),
https://venturebeat.com/2020/06/18/new-york-city-council-passes-law-requiring-nypdto-reveal-its-surveillance-technologies/; City of Helsinki AI Register, https://ai.hel.fi/en/
ai-register/ (last visited Sept. 21, 2022); Algorithmic Systems of Amsterdam,
https://algoritmeregister.amsterdam.nl/en/ai-register/ (last visited Sept. 21, 2022).
253. GEORGE ROBERT BATEMAN, JR., THE TRANSFORMATIVE POTENTIAL OF
PARTICIPATORY BUDGETING: CREATING AN IDEAL DEMOCRACY 1 (2019); HOLLIE RUSSON
GILMAN, PARTICIPATORY BUDGETING AND CIVIC TECH: THE REVIVAL OF CITIZEN ENGAGEMENT
vii (2016) (“PB is a democratic process to empower citizens to decide on public budget
allocations and vote on where and how to implement.”); Brian Wampler, Participatory
Budgeting: Core Principles and Key Impacts, 8 J. PUB. DELIBERATION, Dec. 30, 2012, at 1, 2.
254. GRAHAM SMITH, DEMOCRATIC INNOVATIONS: DESIGNING INSTITUTIONS FOR CITIZEN
PARTICIPATION 65 (3rd ed. 2013).
255. Isaac Jabola-Carolus, Luke Elliott-Negri, James M. Jasper, Jessica Mahlbacher,
Manès Weisskircher & Anna Zhelnina, Strategic Interaction Sequences: The Institutionalization
of Participatory Budgeting in New York City, 19 SOC. MOVEMENT STUD. 640, 641, 646–47 (2018).
256. GILMAN, supra note 253, at viii.
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public a voice in important budgetary decisions, it can also be a
device to “co-opt” activists in service of the “needs of elites and
politicians rather than the citizen participants themselves.”257
Jurisdictions can also limit participatory budgeting to narrow areas,
preserving legislative control of the majority of a city’s fiscal
decisions.258 Jurisdictions can thus appear to accommodate
demands for democratic participation while simply replicating
preexisting spending patterns.259
At the local level, participatory budgeting might be employed
as part of a legislative and public oversight strategy to determine
how police ought to be spending funds, including on technology.
Communities might be asked, for instance, whether they would
prefer that police spend $74,000 on enhanced surveillance cameras,
on officer overtime, or on a robotic dog “to keep police officers out
of harm’s way.”260
But law enforcement presents a particularly thorny case for
participatory budgeting. Police often rely on sources of funding
outside the budgeting process, weakening local control over law
enforcement.261 These external sources of funding may amplify law
enforcement’s militarization and other harmful behaviors.262 And
even if participatory budgeting were guaranteed to succeed in local
257. Thad Calabrese, Dan Williams & Anubhav Gupta, Does Participatory Budgeting
Alter Public Spending? Evidence from New York City, 52 ADMIN. & SOC’Y 1382, 1386 (2020).
258. Id. at 1389 (describing how, in New York City, city council members can commit,
at their discretion, to allocate one million dollars annually to participatory budgeting).
259. Id. at 1403.
260. Maria Cramer & Christine Hauser, Digidog, a Robotic Dog Used by the Police,
Stirs Privacy Concerns, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 27, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/
02/27/nyregion/nypd-robot-dog.html; see also I. Bennett Capers, Race, Policing, and
Technology, 95 N.C. L. REV. 1241, 1273 (2017) (arguing that, in order to deracialize policing
and make it more equitable, law enforcement should add cameras and facial recognition to
extend surveillance to nearly all public spaces in a uniform manner).
261. Rachel A. Harmon, Federal Programs and the Real Costs of Policing, 90 N.Y.U. L. REV.
870, 873 (2015) (observing that many federal public safety programs “undermine the local
political control over police departments” that would otherwise serve as a check on abuse
and misconduct).
262. Id. at 912–13 (“Many of the federal programs that seek to reorient local law
enforcement also encourage significant additional marginal coercion costs.”); Nora V.
Demleitner, Commodifying Policing: A Recipe for Community-Police Tensions, 51 GA. L. REV.
1047, 1069–70 (2017) (arguing that external sources of funding, including police foundations
and federal grant programs, have propelled militarization); Crump, supra note 247, at 1659–
60 (describing passage of state legislation to require local approval of police acquisition of
surplus military equipment).
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contexts, it is an awkward fit for addressing federal expenditures in the
domains of national security, immigration enforcement, and criminal
law enforcement. For one thing, it is difficult to conceptualize an
effective mechanism of “community control” without local ties.
There are also entrenched informational obstacles at the federal
level. Particularly in the national security context, where
classification is frequent, spending on novel high-stakes technologies
may not always be public.263
Although “community control” of police surveillance and
algorithmic governance is routinely touted, most of the existing
initiatives fail to empower communities directly and face
significant obstacles in doing so. None of this is to suggest that
direct community control of law enforcement’s use of algorithmic
governance is not achievable or warranted. But given the current
context of widespread secrecy, privatization, and automation, it is
difficult to imagine without substantial legal and political change.
IV. THE LAW AND POLITICAL ECONOMY OF
ALGORITHMIC GOVERNANCE
Responding to the growing enmeshment of private technology
firms within public governance requires activism that engages
inside firms as well as outside them. At its root, the democratic
vision contests the synthesis of state and corporate power that
makes algorithmic governance possible and that underpins its
socially and racially disparate effects. To fully understand the
significance of the democratic vision, this Part examines some
broader obstacles to democratic control of private and public
governance. It explains the central role of workers and social
movements in determining the appropriate scope of algorithmic
governance. Finally, it raises some questions about the law’s
limited ability to facilitate meaningful change.

263. For example, the federal intelligence budget is classified even though the total
amount is known. David E. Pozen, Deep Secrecy, 62 STAN. L. REV. 257, 274–75 n.51 (2010)
(arguing that the intelligence budget is a relatively shallow secret); Steven Aftergood,
An Inquiry into the Dynamics of Government Secrecy, 48 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 511, 519
(2013) (describing how “the intelligence community totally revised its view of intelligence
budget disclosure”).
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A. Obstacles to Democratic Control
Democratizing algorithmic governance requires more than what
the existing menu of approaches offers. The current approaches to
algorithmic governance replicate the power of private vendors and
take advantage of their control over defining and implementing
key values without building commensurate institutional protections
for public interests. The growing influence of private sector
technology vendors in governance has thus exacerbated obstacles to
democratic control.
At the most basic level, governments often decide to deploy
algorithmic governance through procurement processes that entail
little or no democratic involvement. As Deirdre Mulligan and
Kenneth Bamberger have observed, the procurement process
provides for “little or no agency or outside expertise beyond that
provided by the vendor: no public participation, no reasoned
deliberation, and no factual record.”264 When government actors
contract out to private vendors, they often lack the expertise or
ability to understand how the technology itself functions, raising
troubling questions about accountability and oversight.265 At the
state and local level, privatization is widespread, but governments’
capacity to adequately oversee its private partners may be
particularly underdeveloped.
In theory, the pivotal moment for democratic accountability
occurs on Election Day. But the procurement process is so tilted
in favor of technology vendors that even changes in political
leadership might not foster true accountability. In the context
of algorithmic governance, outsourcing and public-private cooperation
may risk the “abdication” of governmental responsibilities in favor of
discretion embedded within technology firms which retain control over
the design of products used even in public settings.266 If government
capacity to oversee technology cannot keep up, the power of firms

264. Mulligan & Bamberger, supra note 17, at 780; see also Crump, supra note 247, at 1604.
265. Calo & Citron, supra note 30, at 833.
266. See, e.g., Mulligan & Bamberger, supra note 17, at 782–83; Solow-Niederman, supra note 17.
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to engage in de facto policymaking through design may not be
adequately constrained.267
Procurement rules that optimize for low cost virtually invite
government agencies and their private-sector partners to
circumvent opportunities for public participation and contestation
of new modes of algorithmic governance. By short-circuiting
democratic accountability, the procurement process can also
generate potential future legal problems: Kate Crawford and
Jason Schultz have observed that a “monolithic technologyprocurement model” prioritizes short-term cost savings while
overlooking potential constitutional problems that might generate
more substantial costs down the line.268 The result is that the
process of adopting new technologies of governance itself creates
democratic obstacles.
Specific legal doctrines also shield the private role in
algorithmic governance from democratic control (what scholars of
law and political economy call “encasement”).269 For example,
successful trade secrecy claims insulate technology vendors
from scrutiny, even when the vendors enjoy expansive “technical
and legal power.”270 Indeed, trade secrecy can help to conceal
the existence or operation of entire government programs.
Consider how the vendor Harris Corp. sold stingray surveillance
devices to law enforcement agencies it bound to secrecy through
nondisclosure agreements.271 The secrecy protected Harris’s
interests, but it also permitted law enforcement to evade public
records requests and transparency obligations, illustrating how the

267. Mulligan & Bamberger, supra note 17, at 801 (“The adoption of machine learning
systems through procurement can render policymaking invisible.”); Waldman, supra note
27, at 627 (“[A]lgorithmic decision-making empowers engineers to make policy decisions,
embedding their ingrained commitment to efficiency and their indifference to privacy and
other social values in society.”).
268. Crawford & Schultz, supra note 30, at 1950.
269. Amy Kapczynski, The Law of Informational Capitalism, 129 YALE L.J. 1460, 1508
(2020) (“[L]egal ordering is being used not simply to help generate and sustain private power
but to insulate it from democratic control.”) (emphasis in original).
270. Crawford & Schultz, supra note 30, at 1971.
271. Elizabeth E. Joh, The Undue Influence of Surveillance Technology Companies on
Policing, 92 N.Y.U. L. REV. ONLINE 19, 24 (2017).
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interests of vendors and of government institutions sometimes
align against those of the public.272
More generally, algorithms are frequently used in law
enforcement, immigration, national security, and other “low-rights”
environments encased from democratic control. State-sanctioned
secrecy creates informational obstacles that prevent the public from
learning about controversial law enforcement practices and
policies.273 Courts routinely use doctrines such as standing, the
political question doctrine, and qualified immunity to insulate
government actors against liability, particularly when lawsuits
implicate law enforcement and national security programs.274
Private and secret sources of funding and equipment also permit
law enforcement to grow more powerful, free from the prying eyes
of the public.275
As a result, the private status of algorithmic governance does
not diminish government power—in important ways, it expands
it.276 Private firms can act as force multipliers for government agencies
eager to harness potential efficiency gains from automation and
privatization. Consider surveillance firm Palantir, which harvests
vast amounts of data that it repackages into software and sells to
state actors from the Los Angeles Police Department to ICE.277
272. Id.; see supra Section III.A.3.
273. See generally Heidi Kitrosser, Secrecy in the Immigration Courts and Beyond:
Considering the Right to Know in the Administrative State, 39 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 95 (2004)
(examining secrecy in the immigration context); Laura K. Donohue, The Shadow of State
Secrets, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 77 (2010) (examining the state secrets privilege); Jonathan Manes,
Secret Law, 106 GEO. L.J. 803, 840–55 (2018) (examining the legal ecosystem that regulates
“secret law”); Koningisor, supra note 89 (arguing that secrecy obligations have migrated from
national security to local law enforcement settings).
274. Stephen I. Vladeck, The New National Security Canon, 61 AM. U. L. REV. 1295,
1321–23 (2012) (discussing the political question doctrine in the context of post-9/11
cases); David Gray, Collective Standing Under the Fourth Amendment, 55 AM. CRIM. L. REV.
77, 89 (2018) (arguing that Fourth Amendment standing rules have “dramatically
diminished the security of the people against threats of unreasonable search and seizure”);
Joanna C. Schwartz, How Qualified Immunity Fails, 127 YALE L.J. 2, 65 (2017) (arguing that
qualified immunity may not fulfill the doctrine’s stated goals, but still can “significantly
damage law enforcement accountability”).
275. See, e.g., Gorman, supra note 102 (noting the NSA’s use of the “black budget” to
conceal warrantless wiretapping programs); Harmon, supra note 261, at 872.
276. Cf. COHEN, supra note 94, at 242 (“The vast and growing extent of commercial
surveillance facilitates a pervasive entanglement of public and private power, producing a
practical reality within which each feeds off the other and neither can be effectively constrained.”).
277. SARAH BRAYNE, PREDICT AND SURVEIL 7 (2021).
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Palantir’s model, and the expansion of predictive policing
models more generally, does not diminish the power of the state.
Rather, it entangles the interests of private firms with those of
government entities. Outsourcing and privatization entwine the
legal interests of governments and private sector actors.278 Both
government entities and private vendors benefit from the
expansion of contracting and procurement, which simultaneously
permits governments to reap the benefits of cost minimization and
efficiency (at least in theory), while vendors, in turn, profit. The
private role in algorithmic governance can thus provide cover for
expanded surveillance and control.
B. Democratizing the Algorithmic State
The legal framework for algorithmic governance permits
powerful private entities to wield increasing public authority—at
the expense of ordinary people’s oversight. What would it mean,
then, to democratize the algorithmic state—to give every citizen
equal voice and equal opportunity to determine how the power of
technology ought to be wielded?
An emerging body of work on technology law and political
economy is paving the way toward a broader reckoning with the
foundational legal and political structures that provide the conditions
for automation to flourish. For instance, Frank Pasquale called for a
“second wave” of algorithmic accountability scholarship to
consider not just the degree to which algorithmic decision-making
can be procedurally satisfactory but also whether it is substantively
justifiable.279 Other scholars have stressed the urgency of moving
away from a narrow rights-based approach toward a mechanism for
ordinary people to “contest” algorithmic decisions.280 At bottom, the
278. Cf. Kate Sablosky Elengold & Jonathan D. Glater, The Sovereign Shield, 73 STAN. L.
REV. 969, 1030–31 (2021) (describing, in the context of the “sovereign shield” doctrines, how
private contractors have benefited from the support of their agency partners).
279. Frank Pasquale, The Second Wave of Algorithmic Accountability, LPE BLOG (Nov. 25,
2019), https://lpeblog.org/2019/11/25/the-second-wave-of-algorithmic-accountability/.
280. Julia Powles, The Seductive Diversion of “Solving” Bias in Artificial Intelligence,
ONEZERO (Dec. 7, 2018), https://onezero.medium.com/the-seductive-diversion-ofsolving-bias-in-artificial-intelligence-890df5e5ef53 (“Any A.I. system that is integrated
into people’s lives must be capable of contest, account, and redress to citizens and
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growth of privatized automated decision-making calls into
question not only the individual’s ability to seek redress, but the
public’s ability to hold the powerful accountable.281
Responding to private power in algorithmic governance
requires strategies that engage both inside and outside firms. As
Part II detailed, workers at technology firms are stepping forth to
advocate against the development of nefarious technology and its
sale to the public sector.282 White-collar tech worker mobilization
has two defining characteristics: demands for democratic
representation at the workplace and resistance to unethical uses of
the technology workers build.283
In this way, advocates for the democratic vision of algorithmic
accountability are perhaps best understood as demanding radical
forms of participatory democracy that extend even beyond the
public sphere and into the workplace. This vision reflects a broader
challenge to some of the underlying presumptions of democratic
theory. Consider, for instance, Joseph Schumpeter’s skepticism
about public participation, which dates back to the early 1940s.284
Schumpeter’s pessimism about the “typical citizen”—whom he
viewed as irrational, unwise, and prone to outbursts—led him to
reconceive democracy as a method of minimizing potentially
destabilizing democratic inputs.285 Instead, Schumpeter defined
the “democratic method” as the “institutional arrangement for
arriving at political decisions in which individuals acquire the

representatives of the public interest.”); Mariano-Florentino Cuéllar & Aziz Z. Huq, The
Democratic Regulation of Artificial Intelligence, KNIGHT FIRST AMEND. INST. (Jan. 31, 2022),
https://knightcolumbia.org/content/the-democratic-regulation-of-artificial-intelligence.
281. Fourcade & Gordon, supra note 30, at 85 (distinguishing between “holding the
state to account for its decisions . . . and holding the state accountable for what sort of data it
collects in the first place”); Salomé Viljoen, A Relational Theory of Data Governance, 131 YALE
L.J. 573, 584 (2021) (“[Both] propertarian and dignitarian proposals . . . resolve to
individualist claims and remedies that do not represent, let alone address, the relational
nature of data collection and use.”).
282. See supra Part II.
283. See Sam Harnett, The Biggest Tech Unionization Effort Is Happening at the New York
Times, KQED (Apr. 13, 2021), https://www.kqed.org/news/11869185/the-biggest-techunionization-effort-is-happening-at-the-new-york-times.
284. JOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM AND DEMOCRACY 245 (Routledge
2003) (“How is it technically possible for ‘people’ to rule?”).
285. Id. at 261–63 (describing the “typical citizen”); see also IAN SHAPIRO, THE STATE OF
DEMOCRATIC THEORY 11 (2003) (“[D]emocracy fosters mob rule rather than the common good.”).
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power to decide by means of a competitive struggle for the
people’s vote.”286
While Schumpeter feared the participation of “authoritarian”
citizens as destabilizing for democracy, Carole Pateman stressed
the potential for ordinary people to participate.287 Indeed, Pateman
argued that participation is crucial in order to ensure that citizens
can “develop . . . [the] qualities needed for the successful operation
of the democratic system.”288
Most relevant to understanding contemporary worker and
social movements, Pateman rejected a vision of democracy that
stopped at the firm’s front door, instead drawing on the “central
assertion that individuals and their institutions cannot be
considered in isolation from one another,” and that “democracy
must take place in other spheres” outside of formal governance in
order to develop the citizenry as active participants.289 Pateman
argued that democracy requires employees to be able to participate
in and influence managerial decisions.290
Pateman’s work finds a contemporary parallel in that of
Elizabeth Anderson, who has described how “the impoverished
vocabulary of contemporary public discourse” attempts to draw a
sharp line between government by the state and “[t]he supposed
counterpart private sphere . . . where, it is imagined, government
ends, and hence where individual liberty begins.”291 In Anderson’s
telling, workplace governance is “a form of authoritarian, private
government” in which workers are presumptively deprived of all
rights not affirmatively guaranteed them by law.292

286. SCHUMPETER, supra note 284, at 269.
287. CAROLE PATEMAN, PARTICIPATION AND DEMOCRATIC THEORY 15 (1970). Indeed,
Pateman argued for a redefinition of democracy along participatory lines, critiquing existing
definitions as simply replicating “the existing, Anglo-American democratic system.” Id.
288. Id. at 64.
289. Id. at 42.
290. Id. at 72–73 (It is not enough for trade unions or organized labor to play the role of
the “opposition,” while management “perform[s] the role of ‘government.’”).
291. ANDERSON, supra note 93, at 41.
292. Id. at 60.
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C. The Promise—and Limits—of Tech Worker Power
Demands for more control over corporate decision-making are
driving white-collar tech workers to support unionization.293
Although Silicon Valley firms have long been strongly anti-union,
efforts to unionize date back to at least the 1990s, and like
contemporary disputes, they chiefly concerned worker
misclassification, pay, and benefits.294 Today, the highest-profile
battles regarding labor and employment in the technology industry
deal with blue-collar workers and the gig economy.295 Workers
have also resisted the use of technology in management and
disciplinary settings.296
Changes to labor law that make it easier to unionize might
increase worker power inside firms—and result in greater
influence outside firms as well. In high-profile unionization efforts
such as those at Alphabet (Google’s parent company), Medium,
and the New York Times, workers argue that they are entitled to
democratic representation at work and a “seat at the table” with
people in charge.297 Workers also want control over the kinds of
decisions their managers and employers make about developing,
selling, and using new technologies.298 Indeed, as technology firms
take on an increasingly significant role in public governance, their
workers could have dramatic effects on public policy. As Brishen

293. Sam Harnett, Tech Workers Organizing Is Nothing New . . . But Them Actually
Forming Unions Is, KQED (June 2, 2021), https://www.kqed.org/news/11874325/techworker-organizing-is-nothing-new-but-actually-forming-unions-is (describing how support
for unionization among tech workers grew from 33 percent in 2004 to 59 percent in 2016).
294. Danielle D. Van Jaarsveld, Collective Representation Among High-Tech Workers at
Microsoft and Beyond: Lessons from WashTech/CWA, 43 INDUS. REL. 364, 368 (2004); Steven
Greenhouse, Unions Pushing to Organize Thousands of Amazon.Com Workers, N.Y. TIMES (Nov.
13, 2000), https://www.nytimes.com/2000/11/23/business/technology-unions-pushingto-organize-thousands-of-amazoncom-workers.html.
295. See, e.g., Alec MacGillis, Lessons from Bessemer: What Amazon’s Union Defeat Means
for the American Labor Movement, PROPUBLICA (Apr. 13, 2021, 6:45 PM),
https://www.propublica.org/article/lessons-from-bessemer-what-amazons-union-defeat-meansfor-the-american-labor-movement?token=2ivZCyi-F25Tx_k7j8aywTkbU3pkF5Rs; Kate Conger,
Uber and Lyft Drivers in California Will Remain Contractors, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 4, 2020),
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/11/04/technology/california-uber-lyft-prop-22.html.
296. Brishen Rogers, The Law and Political Economy of Workplace Technological Change, 55
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 531, 568, 576–77 (2020).
297. Id. Allyn, supra note 191.
298. Koul & Shaw, supra note 123; MEDIUM WORKERS UNION (MWU), supra note 193.
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Rogers has argued, “Congress could make it far easier for workers
to unionize in the first place” and could change the rules to require
firms to bargain over additional matters that concern workers.299
As the case studies in Part II illustrate, however, workers’
efforts to build power do not always take the form of unionization.
Sometimes, walkouts, open letters, and other forms of protest
create internal pressures for employers to consider or adopt worker
demands.300 But this kind of worker advocacy is usually beyond the
reach of labor and employment law.301 Whistleblower laws do not
protect tech workers who disclose unethical uses of their
employers’ technological innovations.302 Indeed, the law does little
to constrain firms from retaliating against internal critics, leakers,
or organizers, who often lack any recourse under the law of labor
and employment.303 As a result, while tech workers may seek
avenues to influence the provision of private-sector technology to
government agencies for certain uses, the law of labor and
employment instead empowers firms to override worker demands.
Changes to whistleblower laws could fundamentally shift this
power by providing broader protections to workers who bring
forth ethical concerns about technology. Google’s 2020 firing of AI
scientist Timnit Gebru highlights this problem. After Gebru coauthored a paper that raised ethical concerns about large natural

299. Rogers, supra note 296, at 581.
300. See, e.g., Nitasha Tiku, Tony Romm & Craig Timberg, Twitter Bans Trump’s Account,
Citing Risk of Further Violence, WASH. POST (Jan. 8, 2021), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
technology/2021/01/08/twitter-trump-dorsey/ (describing how hundreds of workers wrote a
letter to Twitter management in the aftermath of the January 6, 2021, putsch to demand the
platform take down Donald Trump’s account).
301. Rogers, supra note 296, at 545–46.
302. See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 49.60.210 (making it unlawful for firms to fire
or retaliate against individuals who have opposed employment discrimination and other
unfair employment practices). Some states protect workers who disclose or oppose unlawful
practices. See, e.g., CAL. LAB. CODE § 1102.5(a); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34:19-3(a)(1)–(2)(b).
303. Tom Simonite, What Really Happened When Google Ousted Timnit Gebru, WIRED
(June 8, 2021, 6:00 AM), https://www.wired.com/story/google-timnit-gebru-ai-what-reallyhappened; Kyle Wiggers, How Google Treats Meredith Whittaker is Important to Potential AI
Whistleblowers, VENTUREBEAT (Apr. 24, 2019, 10:45 AM), https://venturebeat.com/
2019/04/24/how-google-treats-meredith-whittaker-is-important-to-potential-ai-whistleblowers/;
Kate Conger & Noam Scheiber, The Great Google Revolt, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 18, 2020),
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2020/02/18/magazine/google-revolt.html. But see
Conger & Scheiber, supra note 116.
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language processing models, Google asked her to remove her
name or retract the paper—and fired her when she refused.304
Gebru’s ethical concerns left her unprotected by the California
whistleblower statute, which allows employees to bring
whistleblower claims if they have a reasonable belief that their
information “discloses a violation of state or federal statute.”305 In
light of the current approach to AI, technology that might facilitate
overbroad or discriminatory surveillance appears perfectly lawful—
and whistleblowing on these topics is therefore unprotected.306
Still, relying on workers and the labor movement as a check
against algorithmic governance has several drawbacks. While
organizers have found modest success at major firms, such as
Google, other worker-led efforts have faltered.307 And even when
workers succeed in getting their employers to drop a government
contract, as in the case of Project Maven, another firm is almost
always ready, willing, and able to step into the gap.308 For that
reason alone, a firm-by-firm approach to countering algorithmic
governance is unlikely to fundamentally reshape either policy or
the market.309
Moreover, even assuming that white-collar tech worker
mobilization can shift power from employers to workers, can it
directly and meaningfully empower marginalized communities? The
answer is far from obvious. Labor’s commitment to “solidarity” with
the oppressed is a matter of both historical and intellectual debate.
Although the labor movement played an important role in the civil
rights struggle of the 1960s, from its earliest days, organized labor

304. Simonite, supra note 303.
305. Cal. Lab. CODE § 1102.5(a).
306. See supra Section III.A.
307. For example, worker-led resistance at GitHub and Palantir appears not to have
had enduring consequences. See supra Section II.C.
308. In the case of Project Maven, that firm was Palantir. Tristan Greene, Palantir Took
over Project Maven, the Military AI Program Too Unethical for Google, THENEXTWEB (Dec. 11,
2019, 8:37 PM), https://thenextweb.com/news/report-palantir-took-over-project-maventhe-military-ai-program-too-unethical-for-google.
309. But see Kate Andrias, The New Labor Law, 126 YALE L.J. 2, 46–47 (2017) (describing
how low-wage workers’ movements are increasingly “seeking to bargain at the sectoral and
regional level, rather than at the firm level”).
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and management have also exploited racial hierarchies.310 Even
today, Leftist thinkers continue to grapple with the perception that
emphasizing racial struggle can be incompatible with ardent
advocacy for workers’ rights.311
Despite this fraught legacy, alliances across labor and social
movements appear to bolster both causes. As union power has
withered and different “organizational models” for protecting
workers’ rights have emerged, workers’ movements have joined
hands with movements for women’s rights and immigrants’ rights.312
Perhaps partly in response to what Estlund calls the “ossification”
of labor law, workers have employed “extralegal” ways of building
power, such as public protests.313 Charles Heckscher has likewise
argued that the labor movement cannot succeed unless it embraces
“systematic alliances with related groups” and unfamiliar tactics to
build pressure on employers.314
Tech workers and social movements are entering into
analogous alliances, networks, and campaigns. Both labor and
social movements stand to gain from these partnerships. Labor
unions can make policy more responsive to the needs of ordinary

310. Paul Frymer, Race, Labor, and the Twentieth-Century American State, 32 POL. & SOC’Y
475, 479 (2004) (describing how union leaders, confronted by civil rights activists about
racism in the labor movement, generally “tried to deny the existence of internal racism as
being anything more than incidental, blame its existence on outside forces, or attack the civil
rights activists as racists, radicals, and antiunion”); DAVID R. ROEDIGER, THE WAGES OF
WHITENESS: RACE AND THE MAKING OF THE AMERICAN WORKING CLASS 49 (2007); DAVID R.
ROEDIGER & ELIZABETH D. ESCH, THE PRODUCTION OF DIFFERENCE: RACE AND THE
MANAGEMENT OF LABOR IN U.S. HISTORY 147 (2012). But see Civil Rights, AFL-CIO,
https://aflcio.org/issues/civil-rights (last visited Sept. 21, 2022) (“The labor movement has
been at the forefront of the struggle for every major civil rights law.”).
311. See, e.g., Akbar, supra note 28, at 447–48 (describing the influence of Cedric
Robinson’s Racial Capitalism within the Movement for Black Lives); see also DAVID R.
ROEDIGER, CLASS, RACE, AND MARXISM 1–29 (2017) (describing the Left’s hostile reception of
Ta-Nehisi Coates’s arguments about reparations).
312. Catherine L. Fisk, Workplace Democracy and Democratic Worker Organizations: Notes
on Worker Centers, 17 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 101, 101–03 (2016).
313. Cynthia L. Estlund, The Ossification of American Labor Law, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 1527,
1605 (2002) (describing “campaigns that appeal directly to the public by way of rallies,
pickets, speeches, and leafleting in public streets and parks, often with the active support of
churches and other community organizations outside the labor movement itself”).
314. Charles Heckscher, Organizations, Movements, and Networks, 50 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV.
313, 313 (2006).
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people.315 Alliances with workers may also serve to broaden and
strengthen social movements that are Left-aligned but more
identity-based.316 Both scholars and activists have noted that social
movements tend to gain power when they bring multiple
constituencies and interest groups together.317 In an era of
diminished civic associations, social movements’ alliances with
labor may also bolster political capacity while taking advantage of
labor’s national reach and reputation.318
Finally, social and labor advocacy might bring controversies
to the surface for political debate and resolution through
deliberative means. Public protests, demonstrations, and
organizing around issues of tech accountability can make the
disadvantages of automation for workers and for impacted
communities visible in a way that, perhaps, the focus on technocratic
accountability does not. Likewise, these movements may be able
to stimulate political change notwithstanding the absence of any
particular legal rights or obligations.319 To be sure, then,
white-collar tech workers can be powerful advocates for
democratization and social justice in the workplace. But the private
sector’s role in providing the infrastructure of governance is also
overdue for a broader rethinking.
315. Benjamin I. Sachs, The Unbundled Union: Politics Without Collective Bargaining, 123
YALE L.J. 148, 151 (2013); Tabatha Abu El-Haj, “Live Free or Die”—Liberty and the First
Amendment, 78 OHIO STATE L.J. 917, 944 (2017) (describing how unionism contributes to a
pluralist civil society comprised of membership-based “organizations that foster informed
political participation”).
316. Some social theorists distinguish between class-based movements and the “new
social movements” of the postindustrial age. See, e.g., Steven M. Buechler, New Social
Movement Theories, 36 SOCIO. Q. 441 (1995); Nelson A. Pichardo, New Social Movements: A
Critical Review, 23 ANN. REV. SOCIO. 411 (1997).
317. See, e.g., James Gustave Speth, American Passage: Towards a New Economy and a New
Politics, 84 ECOLOGICAL. ECON. 181, 183 (2012) (calling for “a fusion of those concerned about
environment, social justice, and political democracy into one progressive force. All are
communities of shared fate because they face the same reality: a political economy that does
not prioritize sustaining human and natural communities[]”).
318. Tabatha Abu El-Haj, Making and Unmaking Citizens: Law and the Shaping of Civic
Capacity, 53 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 63, 91 (2019) (describing how unions are “the only genuine
exception” to the trend of weakening civic associations).
319. For a take on this in another setting, see William H. Simon, Contract Versus Politics
in Corporation Doctrine, in THE POLITICS OF LAW: A PROGRESSIVE CRITIQUE 511, 526 (David
Kairys ed., 3d ed. 1998) (“[T]he disadvantages associated with recent mass capital movement
have been visited largely on workers and local communities, who do not appear in
corporation doctrine.”).
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CONCLUSION
Concerns about the fairness, accountability, and transparency
of algorithmic governance have now reached the mainstream. But
the role of social mobilization and resistance has been surprisingly
absent from scholarly and policy conversations about algorithmic
governance. This omission is a mistake. Demands for bottom-up
control ought to occupy a central position in contemporary debates
about algorithmic governance. Indeed, it is long past time to
consider how law and policy might reallocate the power to govern
algorithms to those who are most directly affected.320
But limiting these interventions to the state itself is not enough.
At bottom, social and labor advocacy demands greater control not
only of these practices by powerful state institutions but also of the
firms that enable them. Together, labor and social movements build
on some of the sharpest critiques of algorithmic governance:
unfairness, opacity, and lack of accountability contribute to the
perception that AI/ML cannot be trusted and must be dismantled.
But these movements also go beyond the standard critiques,
demanding greater control of technology and of its uses by
powerful actors. These demands face significant obstacles. As long
as the political system presumes that governance by algorithm is
objective, neutral, fair, and efficient, encourages privatization, and
promotes oversight only at a bureaucratic remove from the people,
a more equal distribution of political power will be difficult
to achieve.
These movements for bottom-up control offer important
lessons for progressive change in an era of widespread
privatization. The state’s reliance on new technology illustrates
the “pervasive entanglement of public and private power,”
but private control is prevalent even in low-tech contexts.321
The erosion of the line between public and private governance
demands new, boundary-crossing forms of mobilization, resistance,
and engagement. In short, privatization heightens the urgency for
progressive labor and social movements to partner with one another
in order to build countervailing power.
320. See Okidegbe, supra note 18, at 774.
321. COHEN, supra note 38, at 242.
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To be sure, not all attempts to “democratize” algorithmic
governance will be successful. But efforts to democratize
algorithmic governance in cities, workplaces, and communities
across the nation are not simply attempts to throw sand in the
gears. Instead, they express a particular vision of democracy, one
in which ordinary people should be able to choose how powerful
institutions—whether private or public—ought to govern us.
The law stands in the way of our ability to make these choices. It
should not.
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